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Preface 
 
 
In 2008 international food prices raised to record levels. The Netherlands' pol#
icy memorandum Agriculture, rural entrepreneurship and food security mentions 
that these price increases have contributed to a 'change in thinking'. The high 
food prices and resulting unrest in some countries by protesting consumers has 
made it clear how important a well#functioning agricultural sector is. The re#
newed attention for the agricultural sector does not limit itself to increasing pro#
ductivity, although that still remains an important goal, but it also encompasses 
creating an enabling environment which is conducive for the private  
sector, improved value chains and a better functioning of local and regional 
markets.  
 This study focuses on government interventions in cereal markets in four 
East African countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) in the context of 
the high international food prices in 2008, which remained high in 2009 in these 
countries while international prices decreased. This has caused the following di#
lemma for governments: how to choose the optimal extent of intervention in ag#
ricultural input and output markets, balancing the needs and interests of the 
poor urban population and the net food buyers in rural areas on the one hand 
and the interests of farmers on the other hand. The first group benefits from 
government intervention to keep domestic cereal prices low, while farmers 
would be more encouraged to increase production and productivity by high 
prices, especially because prices of seeds and fertilisers also have increased in 
the past two years.  
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 This report aims to contribute's insights from the Ministry of Agriculture, Na#
ture and Food Quality (LNV) into and the policy debate on how to contribute to 
the reduction of rural poverty and improve food security in developing countries. 
The research has benefitted from seminars held in Nairobi (Kenya) and Kampala 
(Uganda). The authors of the study are grateful to all, mainly local participants 
who shared their expertise with the Dutch team. LNV staff (Desiree Hagenaars, 
Co Neeteson, and Roeland Bosch in The Hague and Agricultural Counsellor Pim 
Bruinsma in Nairobi) is much appreciated for their feedback and assistance 
throughout the duration of the study. 
 
 
 
 
 
Prof Dr R.B.M. Huirne 
Director General LEI Wageningen UR 
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Summary 
 
 
Focus of the study 
The aim of this study is to give insight into the different responses of govern#
ments in developing countries with respect to agricultural market developments. 
The study focuses on the role of the government in four East African countries 
(Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Ethiopia) with respect to price formation and 
price transmission in the cereal sector. All four countries were confronted with 
high cereal prices in 2008, but their governments reacted in very different 
ways. Based on literature review and local market reports the analysis and 
comparison of government responses shows how governments did intervene in 
the cereal markets, how domestic supply and demand responded and which lo#
cal and regional factors influence cereal prices in these countries. 
 
Trade policies and agricultural taxation 
History shows that governments in East Africa have always intervened in agricul#
tural markets, mostly via trade policies, but also through domestic policies such 
as taxes and subsidies on outputs and inputs. During the 1960s and 1970s  
# the phase of import#substitution industrialisation # government policy was very 
much biased against agriculture. This bias has been decreased by the reforms 
of the 1980s and 1990s, especially by reducing the taxation of exports. Nowa#
days, agriculture in Kenya and to a lesser extent Uganda is supported, but anti#
agricultural (macro#economic) policies still exist in Ethiopia and Tanzania. Most 
cash crops in Sub#Saharan Africa (such as cocoa, tea and coffee) have always 
been and still are heavily taxed. For cereals the picture is mixed: some crops 
(e.g. sorghum) are subsidised, but others (such as rice, maize and millet) face 
net taxation. 
 
The food crisis and its impact on East Africa 
In 2007 and 2008 the world faced a dramatic increase in food prices. Although 
prices have come down since then, mid#2009 food prices were still relatively 
high in East Africa. Recent price hikes and fluctuations are caused by several 
factors. On the one hand they reflect underlying trends in supply and demand 
for agricultural commodities that began more than a decade ago (e.g. reduced 
productivity growth, increasing food demand in emerging economies, especially 
in Asia) and on the other hand there are a number of more recent developments 
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which all occurred at the same time, thus causing the peak in prices (e.g. lower 
harvests, higher input prices and a strong increase of demand of bio#fuels).  
 Interestingly, cereal prices in East Africa often show a different pattern than 
world prices. First, prices in the four East African countries continued to in#
crease in the summer of 2008 while world prices started to decrease again. 
Second, domestic prices in East Africa fluctuate more than the world price. And 
third, domestic prices in the four countries correlate more with each other than 
with world prices and the influence of world price developments is relatively 
small compared to regional developments. 
 The high food prices caused a food crisis in the four East African countries. 
Some countries had already been plagued by droughts, natural disasters and 
political unrests, while the instability in global markets and the major increase in 
global food prices made importing food very costly, thus making an already 
tight situation even worse. In East Africa the share of household income spent 
on food is generally high, while most people, including cereal producers, are net 
food buyers. Therefore only a small group of net sellers of food was able to 
profit from the high prices. Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania are generally not self#
sufficient in maize and therefore frequently depend on imports. Uganda, in con#
trast, produces a surplus in maize and therefore this country suffered less than 
the other three. 
 The food security situation as well as the factors leading to the crisis dif#
fered between the four East African countries. As shown below this caused gov#
ernments of the four countries to pursue different policies with a different focus 
(short#term versus long#term). 
 
Government responses in Kenya 
In Kenya violence as a result of contested national election results combined 
with poor rains led to failed cereal harvests at the beginning of 2008. In addition 
higher fertiliser prices led to a nearly 30% increase in the costs of production. 
As a result the total Kenyan maize production in 2008 was 29% lower than in 
2007 and 22% lower than in 2006. In January 2009 the government declared 
the food shortage a national disaster, which threatened the lives of about 10m 
people. Kenya is a net importer of maize and in the period when domestic maize 
prices peaked, the country relied heavily on imports from South Africa, the US 
as well as Tanzania and Uganda. On average maize prices in Kenya rose with 
69% in 2008, but there were strong regional price differences, which shows 
that domestic markets were not functioning well. The Kenyan government re#
acted not by tackling the root causes of reduced maize supply, but with direct 
market intervention measures (e.g. reduced taxes, export bans and price con#
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trols). Producers and traders have criticised these measures for being too in#
terventionist and not stimulating the private sector to invest in the maize supply 
chain. Moreover, international donors have pointed out that corruption in the in#
tervention buying National Cereals and Produce Board has worsened the prob#
lems in Kenya. 
 
Government responses in Tanzania 
The food security situation in Tanzania has not been as dire as in Kenya, partly 
because Tanzanian grain reserves were better supplied, although also in Tanza#
nia a large part of the country suffered from moderate food insecurity. Poor har#
vests and natural disasters # such as a volcano eruption and a fire disaster # 
were the main causes. The maize price development in Tanzania shows a differ#
ent pattern than in the other countries: prices started rising relatively early in 
mid#2007 and peaked in January 2008, after which they decreased again until 
mid#2008, mostly due to good harvests. Since then prices are on the rise again 
and they continued to be high in 2009. In order to stabilise the maize market, 
the Tanzanian government enforced an export ban in January 2008, while im#
port duties were also removed. When prices remained high, the government au#
thorised the imports of large quantities of duty#free maize several times and 
extended the export ban to all agricultural commodities. However, exports to 
Kenya and Sudan # countries with much higher price levels # continued, which 
further decreased the domestic maize reserves. The strict export policy of the 
Tanzanian government may have exacerbated the food insecurity situation in 
neighbouring countries, pushing up prices even more, while Tanzanian farmers 
and traders were not able to profit from higher prices. 
 
Government responses in Uganda 
In Uganda, both excessive rains, causing floods, and severe droughts caused 
food shortages in the north#eastern part of the country. Besides these climatic 
factors, decades of civil war have afflicted the same area. However, although 
maize prices are higher than the five#year average, food prices are still relatively 
stable and consistent with normal seasonal patterns. Unlike in the other three 
countries, maize is not a major staple crop in Uganda. The price of a major sta#
ple crop, matoke (cooking banana), was 33% lower in 2008 than in 2007. A 
main reason for higher food prices in Uganda may be import of food by neigh#
bouring countries (e.g. Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda). However, the government 
did not impose any bans, quotas or other restrictions to exports. In contrast, 
the government has seen the high prices as an opportunity to boost production 
and improve the food marketing system by reducing transaction and transport 
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costs. The government continued to pursue agricultural extension, innovation 
stimulating and agricultural credit provision policies. Furthermore, the food#
insecure Karamoja District, which had been hit hard by several consecutive 
droughts, as well as some other parts of the country, has been provided with 
high#yielding seeds and tractors to address the 2008 food crisis. But overall the 
government of Uganda has not taken any short#term direct intervention mea#
sures. 
 
Government responses in Ethiopia 
Mainly severe droughts caused a deteriorating food security situation in Ethiopia 
in mid#2008. The government then estimated it needed about 600,000 tonnes 
of cereals to meet emergency food assistance needs of about 4.6m people. 
However, the government and the World Food Programme were not able to 
meet all demands, which caused prices to increase further. In the first half of 
2009 the situation remained critical and even worsened in some areas. The hike 
in food prices in Ethiopia reflects relatively high inflation in Ethiopia (up to 40% in 
2009). There is also quite some regional differentiation: the local Ethiopian 
maize markets are not well integrated in the world market and interregional 
trade is restricted by inadequate infrastructure and high transaction costs. In 
the period March#October 2008, Ethiopian maize prices almost tripled from 
USD300 to 900 per tonne. The government reacted in several ways: with ex#
port bans on cereals in the beginning of 2008, measures to deal with illegal 
practices of traders, large food imports for the urban poor and elimination of 
fuel subsidies to save money for food consumption subsidies. All these efforts 
to bring down prices have been very costly and the government has been 
forced to implement measures to decrease its budget deficit. 
 
Conclusions 
The effects of high cereals prices on the food security situation in East Africa 
have been shaped by two main factors: the climatic conditions in each country 
and the diverse government responses to the high cereal prices. Although there 
are several regional trade agreements in the region, which, in principle, stimu#
late regional trade, there are still various obstacles to inter#regional trade and 
markets in the four countries are little connected. This explains the large differ#
ences between the domestic maize prices in the four countries. In reaction to 
the food crisis most East African countries, except Uganda, pursued short#term 
policies to reduce food prices for consumers (i.e. price#oriented policies). Only 
in Uganda long#term policies focusing on extension and innovation in order to 
encourage productivity growth were implemented in reaction to the high prices. 
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In most cases farmers were hurt by the short#term price policies (such as price 
controls and the purchase of maize for reserves against set prices below mar#
ket prices), which resulted in lower profits compared to a non#interventionist 
situation. They were also disadvantaged by very high fertiliser prices and as a 
consequence, many farmers reduced their maize cultivation, which again aggra#
vated the food situation. Farmers who are net food buyers were helped by gov#
ernment price policies (although the effect was smaller than for urban 
households). 
 Food security will remain an important issue in the future: prices and price 
variability will remain relatively high in East Africa. The divergence of prices be#
tween and within countries points at high transport and transaction costs. Trade 
can improve regional food insecurity. To facilitate this, governments should help 
to reduce transaction risks and costs through investments in input and output 
markets and infrastructure and through reducing the costs of (regional) trade. 
This will benefit both farmers and consumers.  
 Currently, many farmers do not specialise in cash crops but diversify and 
reserve part of their land for food crops, which is rational in the light of fluctuat#
ing harvests and prices. This strategy reduces their risk but hampers produc#
tivity growth. If farmers would specialise more, investments in terms of inputs 
(such as seeds and fertiliser) would become more economic. Market#based in#
struments can reduce price and income risks of farmers, thus facilitating spe#
cialisation and a shift to a more professional agriculture that can achieve a 
higher productivity. Such instruments can include warehouse receipts systems, 
forward contracts, credit facilities linked to harvests and other marketing in#
struments that reduce price or income risks. Government policies may initiate 
and support local private initiatives. International donors with their financial 
means and expertise can play an important role in reducing transaction risks 
and encourage productivity growth, not only by proposing a set of technical so#
lutions to improve markets, but also by engaging in honest debates with policy#
makers (e.g. on the positive role of traders) and/or by supporting informal insti#
tutional arrangements. 
 
 
 13 
Samenvatting 
Reacties van Oost#Afrikaanse regeringen op hoge 
graanprijzen 
 
 
Doel van de studie 
Het doel van deze studie is om inzicht te geven over de verschillende reacties 
van overheden in ontwikkelingslanden op ontwikkelingen in de agrarische mark#
ten. De studie handelt over de rol van de overheid in vier Oost#Afrikaanse landen 
(Kenia, Tanzania, Oeganda en Ethiopië) bij de prijsvorming en prijstransmissie in 
de graansector. Al deze landen werden geconfronteerd met hoge graanprijzen 
in 2008, maar hun overheden reageerden verschillend. De analyse is gebaseerd 
op literatuuronderzoek en lokale marktrapporten en geeft aan hoe overheden in#
tervenieerden in de markt, hoe binnenlandse vraag en aanbod daarop reageer#
den en welke lokale en regionale factoren daarbij een rol speelden. 
 
Handelsbeleid en landbouwbelasting 
De geschiedenis toont aan dat overheden in Oost#Afrika een lange traditie heb#
ben van interventies in de landbouwmarkten, meestal via handelsbeleid, maar 
ook door binnenlands beleid zoals belastingen en subsidies op producten en in#
puts. In de jaren zestig en zeventig werd de landbouwsector belast ten gunste 
van de opbouw van de industrie (industrialisatie via importsubstitutie). Dit ver#
anderde in de jaren tachtig en negentig, vooral door belastingen op export te 
verminderen. Op dit moment wordt de landbouw in Kenia, en in mindere mate 
ook in Oeganda, ondersteund maar het macro#economische beleid in Ethiopië 
en Tanzania is nog steeds nadelig voor de landbouw. De meeste gewassen in 
Sub#Sahara Afrika (zoals cacao, thee en koffie) worden (nog steeds) belast. De 
situatie is verschillend per graansoort: de productie van sorghum wordt gesub#
sidieerd, maar rijst, mais en millet worden belast.  
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De voedselcrisis en de gevolgen voor Oost#Afrika 
In 2007 en 2008 stegen wereldwijd de voedselprijzen drastisch. Hoewel ze 
sindsdien zijn gedaald, waren de prijzen in de zomer van 2009 nog steeds hoog 
in Oost#Afrika. De recente prijspieken en fluctuaties worden veroorzaakt door di#
verse factoren. Aan de ene kant zijn zij het gevolg van trends in het aanbod en 
de vraag naar landbouwproducten die al meer dan tien jaar geleden begonnen 
(zoals dalende productiviteitsgroei, toename van de vraag in sterk groeiende 
economieën, vooral in Azië) en aan de andere kant trad tegelijkertijd een aantal 
gebeurtenissen op (waaronder tegenvallende oogsten, sterk stijgende input#
prijzen en een forse toename van de vraag naar biobrandstoffen) die de prijzen 
omhoogstuwden.  
 Opmerkelijk is dat de ontwikkeling van de graanprijzen in Oost#Afrika een pa#
troon volgt dat op een aantal punten afwijkt van die van de wereldmarktprijs.  
1. Prijzen in Oost#Afrika bleven stijgen terwijl de piek op de wereldmarkt in de 
loop van 2008 al geweest was.  
2. De prijzen in Oost#Afrika schommelen veel meer dan op de wereldmarkt.  
3. De binnenlandse prijzen van Oost#Afrikaanse landen correleren meer met el#
kaar dan met de wereldmarktprijzen, wat aanduidt dat regionale markt#
ontwikkelingen de prijsvorming meer bepaalt dan ontwikkelingen op de 
internationale markt.  
 
 De hoge voedselprijzen veroorzaakten een voedselcrisis in de vier Oost#
Afrikaanse landen. Sommige landen werden al geplaagd door droogte, natuur#
rampen en politieke onrust, terwijl oplopende internationale prijzen de import 
van voedsel snel duurder maakten. In Oost#Afrika wordt een groot deel van het 
inkomen aan voedsel besteed en een groot deel van de bevolking (ook veel boe#
ren) voedsel moet aankopen. Als gevolg daarvan heeft slechts een klein deel 
van de bevolking (de nettoverkopers van voedselproducten) kunnen profiteren 
van hoge prijzen. Ethiopië, Kenia en Tanzania zijn doorgaans niet zelfvoorzie#
nend in mais en dus regelmatig afhankelijk van import. Oeganda, daarentegen, 
produceert wel een overschot aan mais. 
 De voedselsituatie en de oorzaken die hebben geleid tot de crisis verschillen 
tussen de vier landen. Zoals hierna wordt beschreven, heeft dit tot gevolg ge#
had dat de overheden in de vier landen kozen voor verschillende beleidsopties.  
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Beleidreacties van de overheid in Kenia 
In Kenia leidde geweld als gevolg van betwiste resultaten van de nationale  
verkiezingen gecombineerd met geringe regenval tot het mislukken van de 
graanoogsten in het begin van 2008. Daar kwam bij dat door hogere kunstmest#
prijzen de productiekosten fors toenamen. Het gevolg was dat de Keniaanse 
maisproductie in 2008 bijna 30% lager was dan in 2007 en ruim 20% lager dan 
in 2006. In januari 2009 verklaarde de overheid het voedseltekort tot een na#
tionale ramp die het leven van circa 10 mln. mensen bedreigde. Kenia is een 
netto#importeur van mais en, terwijl binnenlandse prijzen een piek bereikten, 
moest het land mais importeren uit Zuid#Afrika, de VS en ook uit Tanzania en 
Oeganda. Gemiddeld namen de prijzen voor mais met 70% toe in 2008 maar er 
waren grote regionale verschillen, wat aanduidt dat de binnenlandse markt niet 
goed functioneerde. De Keniaanse regering reageerde met directe markt#
interventies, waaronder het opkopen van graan, belastingverlaging voor con#
sumenten, een exportverbod en prijsbevriezing. Producenten en handelaren 
bekritiseerden deze maatregelen heftig omdat het de private sector niet zou 
aanzetten tot meer investeringen in de maisketen. Bovendien wezen internatio#
nale donoren op corruptie die zich zou voordoen bij een semi#overheidsinstantie 
die de aan# en verkoop van graan verzorgt. 
 
Beleidsreacties van de overheid in Tanzania 
De voedselsituatie in Tanzania was niet zo nijpend als in Kenia, deels omdat de 
graanreserves in Tanzania groter waren. Toch werd de voedselzekerheid in de#
len van het land bedreigd, vooral door slechte oogsten en natuurrampen (vul#
kaanuitbarsting en bosbranden). De prijsontwikkeling van mais heeft in Tanzania 
een ander patroon dan in de andere drie landen: prijzen stegen relatief vroeg in 
2007 en piekten in januari 2008, waarna ze weer daalden tot halverwege 2008 
als gevolg van goede oogsten. Sindsdien zijn de prijzen echter weer gestegen 
en ze zijn hoog gebleven in 2009. Met het doel de markt te stabiliseren kondig#
de de Tanzaniaanse regering een exportverbod voor mais af in januari 2008 en 
werden importtarieven opgeheven. Toen prijzen hoog bleven, stond de regering 
enkele malen grote hoeveelheden heffingsvrije import van mais toe en werd het 
exportverbod tot alle landbouwproducten uitgebreid. Toch bleef uitvoer van  
mais naar Kenia en Soedan (waar prijzen hoger waren) plaatsvinden, waardoor 
binnenlandse reserves verder afnamen. Het strikte exportbeleid van de Tanza#
niaanse regering kan de situatie van voedselschaarste in omringende landen 
verergerd hebben, door de prijzen op te stuwen terwijl boeren in het land niet 
konden profiteren van die hogere prijzen. 
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Beleidsreacties van de overheid in Oeganda 
In het noordoosten van Oeganda veroorzaakten zowel uitzonderlijk zware regen 
als droogte voedseltekorten. Daarnaast woedde in deze regio jarenlang een 
burgeroorlog. Toch zijn de voedselprijzen er relatief stabiel en volgen ze het 
normale seizoenspatroon, hoewel de recente maisprijzen wel hoger zijn dan het 
5#jaarlijkse gemiddelde. Anders dan in de andere drie landen van deze studie is 
mais niet het belangrijkste voedselgewas in Oeganda; dat is matoke (cooking 
banana), waarvan de prijs in 2008 een derde lager was dan in 2007. Een reden 
voor de hogere prijzen voor mais is de vraag van importerende buurlanden  
(Kenia, Tanzania en Rwanda). De regering stelde geen verbod of quotum in om 
de export te beperken. Integendeel, de regering zag de hogere prijzen als een 
kans om de productie en verkoop te stimuleren, onder meer door transactie# en 
transportkosten te verminderen. De Oegandese overheid zette het beleid van 
landbouwvoorlichting, investeringssteun aan innovaties en landbouwkrediet 
voort. Bovendien stelde de regering zaden en tractors beschikbaar in onder 
meer het Karamoja District, waar voedselschaarste heerst in verband met voort#
durende droogte. De regering nam geen kortetermijnmaatregelen die gevolgen 
zouden hebben voor consumenten# dan wel producentenprijzen. 
 
Beleidsreacties van de overheid in Ethiopië 
Vooral door droogte is halverwege 2008 de voedselsituatie in Ethiopië sterk 
verslechterd. De overheid schatte in dat er ongeveer 600.000 ton graan nodig 
zou zijn als noodhulp om aan de behoeften van 4,6 mln. mensen te kunnen vol#
doen. Echter, de overheid en het Wereld Voedselprogramma waren niet in staat 
om aan deze vraag te voldoen, waardoor prijzen verder stegen. In de eerste 
helft van 2009 bleef de situatie kritiek en deze verslechterde in sommige regi#
o's nog verder. De stijging van de voedselprjzen in Ethiopië reflecteert ook de 
buitengewoon hoge algemene inflatie in het land (tot wel 40% in 2009). Er zijn 
ook sterke regionale verschillen: de lokale maismarkt is niet zo goed geïnte#
greerd met de internationale markt en interregionale handel wordt belemmerd 
door onvoldoende infrastructuur en hoge transportkosten. In de periode maart 
tot oktober 2008 steeg de prijs van Ethiopische mais van 300 naar USD 900 
per ton. De regering reageerde met diverse maatregelen: een exportverbod op 
graan begin 2008, optreden tegen illegale praktijken van handelaren, grote 
voedselimporten (ten behoeve van de stedelijke armen) en het afschaffen van 
brandstofsubsidies om geld uit te sparen voor voedselsubsidies voor de consu#
menten. Deze pogingen om de prijzen voor consumenten te drukken, heeft veel 
geld gekost en de regering staat nu onder druk om maatregelen te nemen om 
de overheidstekorten te verminderen.   
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Conclusies 
De gevolgen van hoge graanprijzen op voedselzekerheid in Oost#Afrika worden 
door twee factoren bepaald: klimatologische (weers)omstandigheden en de di#
verse beleidsreacties op de hoge graanprijzen. Hoewel er verschillende regiona#
le handelsakkoorden zijn die in principe de onderlinge handel faciliteren, zijn er 
nog diverse obstakels en zijn de markten van de vier landen slecht met elkaar 
verbonden. Dit verklaart de grote verschillen tussen de binnenlandse prijzen 
voor mais in de vier landen. In reactie op de voedselcrisis hebben de Oost#
Afrikaanse landen, met uitzondering van Oeganda, kortetermijnmaatregelen uit#
gevaardigd om de prijzen voor consumenten te verlagen (op prijs gerichte inter#
venties). Alleen in Oeganda richtte het overheidsbeleid zich als reactie op de 
hoge prijzen op voorlichting en innovatie om productiviteitsgroei aan te moedi#
gen. In veel gevallen werden de boeren benadeeld door de kortetermijnprijspoli#
tiek (waaronder prijsbevriezing en de aankoop van mais voor voorraadvorming 
tegen prijzen die benden de marktprijs lagen), waardoor ze lagere opbrengsten 
behaalden dan het geval zou zijn geweest zonder ingrijpen van de overheid. 
Boeren werden ook geconfronteerd met hogere kunstmestprijzen waardoor ze 
minder mais produceerden en de voedselsituatie verder verslechterde. Boeren 
die nettokoper van voedsel zijn, werden door het overheidsbeleid gesteund 
maar in mindere mate dan de stedelijke consumenten.  
 Voedselzekerheid blijft een belangrijk onderwerp: voedselprijzen zullen hoog 
en prijsschommelingen groot blijven in Oost#Afrika. Het verschil in prijzen tussen 
en binnen landen duidt op hoge transport# en transactiekosten. Handel kan bij#
dragen aan het verhogen van de regionale voedselzekerheid. Om dit te bereiken 
kan de overheid transactierisico's en #kosten helpen verlagen door te investeren 
in verbeterde toegang tot markten voor inputs en outputs, en in infrastructuur, 
en door de (administratieve) kosten van regionale handel te helpen verminderen. 
Deze maatregelen zullen zowel producenten als consumenten ten voordeel zijn.  
 Veel boeren specialiseren zich niet in marktgewassen maar spreiden hun 
aandacht en risico's en reserveren ten minste een deel van hun land voor voed#
selgewassen, wat rationeel gedrag is in het licht van schommelende oogsten en 
prijzen. Deze strategie vermindert hun risico maar beperkt ook de producti#
viteitsgroei. Als boeren zich meer specialiseren, worden investeringen in het 
gebruik van productiemiddelen sneller rendabel. Marktinstrumenten kunnen prijs# 
en inkomensrisico's van boeren verminderen en dus specialisatie mogelijk ma#
ken, wat een professionelere landbouw tot gevolg zal hebben met een hogere 
productiviteit. Deze instrumenten kunnen bijvoorbeeld zijn: opslagbewijzen  
(warehouse receipts), termijncontracten, kredietfaciliteiten verbonden aan de 
oogst# en andere verkoopinstrumenten waarmee prijs# en inkomensrisico's kun#
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nen worden verminderd. Overheidsbeleid kan lokale private initiatieven helpen 
opzetten en ondersteunen. Ook internationale donoren kunnen met financiële 
middelen en expertise een belangrijke rol spelen in het verminderen van trans#
actierisico's voor boeren en handelaren en in het stimuleren van productivi#
teitsgroei. Dat kunnen zij doen door zich, naast technische oplossingen voor 
verbeterde marktwerking aan te dragen, (meer) in het debat met beleidsmakers 
te begeven (bijvoorbeeld over de positieve rol die handelaren kunnen spelen bij 
het verbeteren van marktwerking) en/of door ondersteuning van informele insti#
tutionele verbintenissen.  
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1 Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Background and focus 
 
In several ways, 2008 was an exceptional year with food prices rising to record 
levels. The Netherlands policy memorandum Agriculture, rural entrepreneurship 
and food security states that these price increases on international agricultural 
markets have contributed to a 'change in thinking' (DGIS/LNV, 2008). The high 
food prices and resulting unrest in some countries by protesting consumers has 
made it clear how important a well#functioning agricultural sector is. The re#
newed attention for the agricultural sector does not limit itself to increasing 
productivity, although that still remains an important goal, but it also encom#
passes creating an enabling environment which is conducive for the private sec#
tor, improved value chains and a better functioning of local and regional 
markets.  
 In this report, we focus on the role of government in promoting agricultural 
market development, with an emphasis on prices and local and national mar#
kets. The aim is to analyse the policy and intervention options in these areas, 
within the ongoing discussion concerning the optimal extent of government pol#
icy intervention in agricultural input and output markets in Africa. To focus this 
analysis, we have taken the unprecedented rise in cereal prices as a case be#
cause it compelled many governments into action. We analysed what has hap#
pened in four East African countries (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda en Ethiopia) that 
were all confronted with high international food prices, but whose governments 
have acted in very different ways. The analysis and comparison between coun#
tries show how the governments in the selected countries became involved in 
the functioning of cereal markets and what position they took with respect to 
the private sector. It also gives an insight into how the domestic markets of 
these East African countries function, and how local and regional factors have 
influenced cereal prices in these countries.  
 
 
1.2 Conceptual framework 
 
Our study focuses on the role of governments in the cereal sector, with an em#
phasis on price formation and transmission in agricultural markets in (east) Af#
rica. Figure 1.1 explains how prices are transmitted to consumers. Prices 
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function to balance the quantity demanded by consumers, and the quantity sup#
plied by producers, resulting in an economic equilibrium of price and quantity 
traded. High prices thus signal a high demand relative to a mainly low supply 
and vice versa. Domestic prices are influenced by not only domestic demand 
and supply but also demand and supply in neighbouring countries and on the 
world market. However, most markets are not completely free but are influ#
enced by (sometimes substantial) government influence. Prices are therefore 
also affected to a great extent by governments.  
 World prices are affected by trade policies # subsidies, tariffs, quotas, stan#
dards, market access # of developing and developed countries. World prices are 
transmitted to domestic prices through border measures, such as tariffs and 
quotas. Domestic prices are influenced by institutional structures, level of de#
velopment of markets and the level of infrastructure. These factors usually lead 
to differences in prices in different local markets (i.e. geographical dispersion). 
However, domestic prices are also influenced by local supply factors (repre#
sented by the box 'Farmers') and local demand factors (represented by the box 
'Consumers'). If markets function perfectly, then geographically dispersed sup#
ply will meet geographically dispersed demand and there will be one equilibrium 
price in different locations. However, in developing countries markets and their 
underlying institutions (the box 'Institutions') do not function perfectly. Factors 
such as transaction risk, transaction and transport costs lead to inefficiencies, 
a mismatch between demand and supply1 and locally dispersed prices.  
 
Figure 1.1  Impact of government interventions on prices and price 
transmission 
 
 
                                                 
1 This means that in some local areas there may be high supply (and low prices) while in another area 
there remains a shortage of supply (and low prices). This explains why, in a certain country, there 
may be a surplus in one area and food insecurity in another.  
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 Figure 1.1 distinguishes four major areas in which the government influences 
prices and price transmission. First, in trade policy through border measures 
(tariffs, quotas, et cetera). They play a major role in many African countries, as 
these measures often generate income for the government, but often also in#
hibit free flow of goods between neighbouring countries.1 Second, subsidies and 
taxes geared towards the farming community affect prices that farmers obtain 
for their produce or pay for inputs. Inputs such as fertilisers or water might be 
subsidised to decrease costs of farming while output might be taxed (e.g. when 
it is brought to the market). However, produce can also be indirectly taxed 
through border measures (especially when produce is for export; this is indi#
cated by the dashed line). Third, governments have influence over many institu#
tions, including market institutions, and infrastructure that facilitates the 
functioning of markets (see below for more). Finally, governments can support 
consumers' incomes and expenditures through public goods and transfers (e.g. 
food subsidies, food for work programmes). 
 Benson et al. (2008) have specified government policies that tackle high 
food prices into three categories, which can be distinguished by the time hori#
zon with which they can be implemented (short, medium or long term see 
Table 1.1). The first two categories fall into the 'Consumers' box of Figure 1.1 
while the last one falls into the 'Farmers' category. This specification will be 
used to classify and evaluate the government responses to the price develop#
ments in the four East African countries. 
 
                                                 
1 Non#tariff measures (NTMs), which are all trade measures that are not tariffs, are becoming more 
important in international trade. NTMs increasingly impede trade from African countries to western 
markets, but they probably do not affect trade between African countries and imports of food crops 
into Africa.  
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Table 1.1 Potential policy responses to food crises 
Time frame Type of inter5
vention short term  
(<1 year) 
medium term  
(153 years) 
long term  
(>3 years) 
Reduce food 
prices for con#
sumers (price#
oriented poli#
cies) 
 
# Reduce tariffs/taxes 
on food  
# Adopt food price 
controls/take action 
against profiteers 
# Adopt consumer 
subsidies 
# Adopt food export 
bans or taxes 
# Pursue government 
food imports 
# Release food reserve 
stocks 
Same options as short 
term plus: 
# Establish food re#
serves and release 
policy 
# Establish variable tar#
iffs or variable export 
subsidies/taxes 
# Pursue options to in#
crease domestic 
food production (see 
below) 
Same options as me#
dium term plus: 
# Invest in marketing 
infrastructure, insti#
tutions, and informa#
tion 
# Invest in increased 
food production ca#
pacity (see below) 
Increase food 
availability for 
(or income of) 
target groups 
(income#oriented 
policies) 
 
# Increase support 
through existing so#
cial protection pro#
grams 
# Increase public sec#
tor wages 
# Increase food aid 
programs 
Same options as short 
term plus: 
# Establish new social 
protection programs 
or expand/improve 
existing ones 
Same options as me#
dium term and those 
for increasing food 
production plus: 
# Invest in other de#
velopment and anti#
poverty programs 
(e.g. education, 
promote rural non#
farm enterprises) 
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Table 1.1 Potential policy responses to food crises (continued) 
Time frame Type of inter5
vention short term  
(< 1 year) 
medium term  
(153 years) 
long term  
(> 3 years) 
Increase food 
production (sup#
ply#oriented poli#
cies) 
Limited short#term op#
tions 
 
# Adopt input subsi#
dies 
# Adopt producer price 
supports and subsi#
dies 
# Expand agricultural 
credit 
# Strengthen agricul#
tural extension 
Same options as me#
dium term plus: 
# Pursue agricultural 
R&D 
# Invest in productive 
infrastructure and 
assets (e.g. irriga#
tion, mechanisation) 
# Improve natural re#
source management 
# Improve property 
rights and resource 
tenure systems 
Source: Benson et al. (2008). 
 
 Figure 1.1 shows that institutions play a central role in the way prices are 
transmitted and as discussed, whether prices converge or remain dispersed 
over different geographical locations. We identify institutional arrangements and 
institutional environment (see Eaton et al., 2008). The institutional environment 
consists of the broader socio#economic framework within which different institu#
tional arrangements take place. In considering the institutional environment, a 
distinction is often made between formal and informal institutions. Formal insti#
tutions are 'embodied in constitutions, laws, the structure of state decision (the 
number of veto players and their mode of selection) and regulations enforced by 
judges, courts, police, bureaucracy, and the like' whereas informal institutions 
are 'norms of conduct, perhaps historical traditions or religious precepts' en#
forced by custom or habit (Keefer and Shirley, 2000). We can distinguish vari#
ous components making up the formal institutional environment, in terms of 
applicable scope and specificity. For example, legal frameworks, especially 
property and contract laws and their supporting institutions, have a fundamental 
and broad significance for the cost and uncertainty associated with exchanging 
goods and services in general. On the other hand, government macroeconomic 
policy, which may involve regulations concerning taxation, government spend#
ing, monetary policy and exchange policy, may change frequently and can be 
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seen as influencing relative market prices in the economy. The institutional envi#
ronment is the product of its history: powerful groups and individuals shape fun#
damental institutions to maintain their power. These institutions persist not just 
because powerful elites enforce them, but also because they become part of 
society's shared beliefs about how the world works, or should work, beliefs 
about how others will behave, or should behave. Such institutions thus become 
internalised norms and can be difficult to change (Shirley, 2008; North, 2005).  
 North et al. (2009) characterise most developing countries as 'natural 
states',1 which manage the problem of violence by forming a dominant coalition 
that limits access to valuable resources # land, labour, and capital # or access to 
and control of valuable activities # such as trade # to elite groups. The state uses 
limited economic entry to generate economic rents which are used to create 
credible commitments among elites to support the current regime and provide 
order. In this sense, it is important to note that the state contains much more 
than the formal structure of government and also includes (other) powerful ac#
tors with power that are not identified with the formal government. North et al. 
(ibid) make several points about the functioning of natural states that are impor#
tant to our analysis. 
1. In a natural state, politics and economics are linked: the operation of mar#
kets and democratic institutions are not independent and all bit economic 
organisations are also political ones. Therefore, North et al. (ibid) emphasise 
that economic and political systems are deeply intertwined. 
2. Although natural states may have some of the features and institutions of 
economic and political competition that developed countries or 'open access 
states' have, these do not work the same way as in an open access state. 
Markets in natural states have far less access and are subject to far more 
explicit privilege and rent#creation, and are therefore significantly less com#
petitive. Prices frequently do not reflect marginal costs. Also, in open ac#
cess states, impartial, rule#of#law courts impose penalties on the executive 
branch of government when it fails to implement the laws according to the 
provisions specified in the law. However, this rarely happens in natural 
states where (often corrupt) courts do not constrain the executive branch.2  
3. The personalistic, rent#creation basis of natural states makes it difficult for 
them to produce many of the common public goods and services associated 
with markets and economic growth. Natural states are also more subject to 
                                                 
1 They label these states natural because, for most of the last ten thousand years, it has been virtu#
ally the only form of society that has been capable of securing physical order and managing violence. 
2 This is often described in terms of weak or no institutions, but this terminology is a bit misleading 
because as North et al. describe, there are (strong) institutions.  
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populism and policies that create macroeconomic imbalances and budget#
ary crises. The institutional environment, particularly in terms of legal 
frameworks, leads to difficulties in enforcing impersonal contracts, and rent#
seeking behaviour by politicians, bureaucrats, criminals and the private sec#
tor.  
 
 All these factors use resources and restrain economic and technological de#
velopment, which reduces access to markets and market development. Low lev#
els of economic activity lead to thin markets,1 high transaction risks and costs, 
and high unit costs for infrastructural development. This is one way of describ#
ing the 'low level equilibrium traps' afflicting the poor in many rural areas within 
low#income economies (Dorward et al., 2004; North et al., 2009). 
 When the institutional environment is weak, transactions are often governed 
through informal institutional arrangements, which is the case for much of East 
African grain trade. Institutional arrangements2 refer to a set of rules or agree#
ments governing the activities of a specific group of people pursuing a certain 
objective. Different types of examples include a contract # often verbal # (such as 
simply to exchange goods, or a sharecropping agreement between landlord and 
tenant farmer. Another example is a producers' organisation # an agreement 
among farmers perhaps to jointly purchase inputs or deliver produce to clients # 
and so on. Institutional arrangements thus involve agreements to exchange or 
coordinate goods or services (such as labour). Concluding and enforcing such 
agreements entails the expenditure of resources, referred to as transaction 
costs.  
 A weak institutional environment also leads to relatively high transaction 
risks. To protect oneself against risks or perceived risks of transaction failure, 
market participants incur costs (i.e. transaction costs). A large share of transac#
tion costs consists of the expenditure of time on the part of buyers or sellers 
(search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, monitoring and 
enforcement costs). Governments have a role in reducing transaction risks, 
costs and making markets more efficient and more equitable. We see three 
broad areas in which the government can do this (Keefer and Shirley, 2000): 
                                                 
1 Thin markets are markets with few market participants and low levels of trade. 
2 North et al. (2009) identify institutions and organisations. Organisations consist of specific groups 
of individuals pursuing a mix of common and individual goals through partially coordinated behaviour. 
Organisations coordinate their members' actions, so an organisation's actions are more than the sum 
of the actions of the individuals. Organisations have their own internal institutional structure: the rules, 
norms, and shared beliefs that influence the way people behave within the organisation. This definition 
overlaps that of an institutional arrangement, but we view institutional arrangements to be a some#
what broader and looser concept: the participants of an institutional arrangement are not set. 
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1. Improving property and contract laws and their supporting institutions, which 
have a fundamental and broad significance for the cost and uncertainty as#
sociated with exchanging goods and services in general; 
2. Government macroeconomic policy, which may involve regulations concern#
ing taxation, government spending, monetary policy and exchange policy. 
Changes to these can be frequent and seen as influencing relative market 
prices in the economy;1 
3. Establishing or facilitating infrastructure and organisations that will reduce 
transaction risks and have a public goods nature: market information sys#
tems; roads; physical markets that include weighing equipment, storage; 
commodity exchanges; labelling and certification organisations, et cetera. 
 
 In the past, in many African countries, governments have often sought to re#
place markets by government bodies (such as marketing parastatals). However, 
it is currently generally acknowledged that governments should play a facilitat#
ing rather than a direct role in markets. Appropriate interventions are thus indi#
rect in nature. Stiglitz (1989:202) has stated that:  
 
'Market failures are particularly pervasive in LDCs [low development 
countries]. Good policy requires identifying them, asking which can be di#
rectly attacked by making markets work more effectively (and in particu#
lar, reducing government imposed barriers to the effective working of 
markets), and which cannot. We need to identify which market failures 
can be ameliorated through non#market institutions (with perhaps the 
government taking an instrumental role in establishing these nonmarket 
institutions). We need to recognise both the limits and the strengths of 
markets, as well as the strengths, and limits, of government interven#
tions aimed at correcting market failures.' 
 
 This quote shows how complicated it is to balance government intervention 
on the one hand and leaving markets (with possible market failures) alone on the 
other hand. Generally, transaction risks are high in developing countries, which 
call for government intervention to reduce these risks and resulting costs di#
rectly or through the amelioration of market failures. However, given the func#
                                                 
1 Keefer and Shirley put forward that the security of property rights and the credibility of contracting 
is relatively more important for economic performance than the more common economic policy in#
struments: 'countries with high levels of institutional quality and poor macroeconomic policies grew 
twice as fast as countries with the reverse combination' (Keefer and Shirley, 2000). 
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tioning of a natural state, and the internal logic behind it, it remains to be seen 
whether governments in developing countries will take up these functions.  
 
 
1.3 Overview of chapters 
 
In this report, we will give an overview of past and current state of government 
involvement in agricultural development through trade policies, and through ag#
ricultural and macro#economic policies (e.g. agricultural subsidies, taxation and 
exchange rate policy). In between, important institutional aspects other than 
government interventions and policies will be mentioned but are not dealt with 
explicitly and in detail. 
 Chapter 2 starts with a historical overview of the government trade inter#
ventions in the four East African countries. This chapter covers the left half of 
Figure 1.1. (trade policy). Chapter 3 then discusses agricultural and macro#
economic policies and how these policies have influenced (indirect) agricultural 
taxation at the farmers' level. Chapter 3 therefore broadly covers the right half 
of Figure 1.1 (subsidies, taxes, public goods and transfers). Chapter 4 reviews 
major causes and the effects of the food crisis in a general sense. Chapter 5.8 
presents in more detail an analysis of the effects of government policies on ce#
real markets, farmers and consumers in each of the four countries (Kenya, Tan#
zania, Uganda and Ethiopia), which is being summarised and synthesised in 
chapter 9. Conclusions are presented in chapter 10. 
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2 Trade policies 
 
 
2.1 Three phases 
 
Seen in a historical context, Africas agricultural and trade policy has gone 
through three distinct phases:  
1. the phase during which colonial powers determined agricultural policy; 
2. the phase which came after independence (around the 1960s for most Afri#
can countries); 
3. the phase during which Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) were im#
plemented, liberalising economies and reducing the role of the government, 
which happened in the 1980s. 
 
 Prior to the early 1960s, when many African countries gained independence, 
African trade policy was defined by the colonial powers. Primary commodities 
were exported from Africa and manufactured products were imported. The 
trade structure of African countries during this period was driven by the inter#
ests of the colonial powers. 
 After independence, the trade policies of many countries in Africa were in#
spired by the principle of import#substitution industrialisation (including Ethiopia 
and Tanzania). This strategy advocated the protection of the domestic market 
from foreign competition in order to promote domestic industrial production. 
Import#substitution industrialisation was widely accepted in the 1960s and 
1970s as a viable policy to help developing countries achieve structural trans#
formation and lessen their dependence on primary production. 
 Trade policies in most African countries during 1960#1980/1990 were 
characterised by extensive government involvement in the economy, both in 
production and in marketing. Additionally, the domestic market in these coun#
tries was shielded from foreign competition through a number of policy meas#
ures. Nontariff measures (NTMs) such as quantitative import restrictions and 
government licences were used profusely to restrict imports. Tariff structures 
were often highly complex, with a large number of tariff rates, and tariffs were 
high. Exports were often restricted by a number of export taxes and strict rules 
and regulations. The exchange rates of many countries were often overvalued 
and access to foreign exchange was rationed. The import#substitution industri#
alisation did not work as intended. Instead, many countries in Africa found 
themselves facing difficult global conditions with economies that lacked com#
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petitiveness due to excessive state intervention in the economy and misman#
agement. 
 In the 1980s and 1990s, the international financial institutions advocated a 
policy package of market#oriented reforms or 'Structural Adjustment Pro#
grammes' (SAPs) to tackle policy inadequacies such as overvalued exchange 
rates, restrictive trade regulations as well as excessive taxation of agricultural 
exports through marketing boards. Substantial currency devaluation and trade 
liberalisation, along with the dismantling of industrial protection measures were 
advocated. By the second half of the 1980s, about 60% of African countries 
were undergoing or had gone through a structural adjustment programme de#
signed in collaboration with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). By the mid#1990s, most African countries had undertaken such pro#
grammes (UNCTAD, 2008a). 
 
 
2.2 Impact of trade liberalisation 
 
Two main trade liberalisation policies were expected to have a direct positive 
impact on the agricultural sector and exports. One was to cut high taxation on 
the sector by aligning producer prices with world prices. The second was to 
promote the development of private input and output markets ('getting prices 
right'). As part of this process, agricultural marketing boards were dismantled 
and subsidies on a range of inputs, such as fertilisers or insecticides, were cut. 
The sector was also expected to benefit from macroeconomic policies such as 
reducing the overvaluation of the exchange rate and providing a more stable 
macroeconomic environment. Such policies were supposed to enable agricul#
tural exporters to capture a higher proportion of the world market price for their 
products, which would then give them a greater incentive to produce and export 
more. 
 After trade liberalisation, the trade balance in Africa worsened. In other de#
veloping countries, the increase in imports was compensated by a sharp rise in 
exports (Table 2.1). In Africa, the more limited export response was responsible 
for increased trade deficits. It must be pointed out that there is no direct cause 
and effect relationship between trade liberalisation and trade deficits. UNCTAD 
(2008a) finds that the main factors that have constrained the African export re#
sponse to liberalisation relative to other developing countries have been export 
momentum and the real effective exchange rate. The concept of export momen#
tum refers to a country's capacity to maintain its level of exports over time, and 
African countries have not been able to achieve this.  
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Table 2.1  Trade performance before and after liberalisation (Median values 
as a percentage of GDP) 
    Before After % change 
Imports 28.1 37 32 
Exports 22.4 29.5 32 
All developing countries  
Trade balance #4.3 #5.9 #37 
Imports 31 34 10 
Exports 23.2 25.7 11 
Africa  
Trade balance #6.6 #7.7 #17 
Imports 23 38.9 62 
Exports 21.1 31.6 50 
Non#African Developing countries 
Trade balance #2.7 #4.9 #81 
Source: UNCTAD (2008a). 
 
 The trade structure of African countries did not change much following trade 
liberalisation. Most countries in the region remain essentially primary product 
exporters, with only a few countries drawing a significant part of their export 
revenue from manufactured products. This leaves the majority of African coun#
tries dependent on volatile global commodity prices. In comparative terms, sub#
Saharan Africa is the region of the developing world with the highest depend#
ence on primary product exports (Table 2.2).  
 
Table 2.2 Three main export and import goods in four East African 
countries (2006) 
Exports 
Ethiopia Kenya Tanzania Uganda 
# coffee 
# qat 
# gold 
# tea 
# horticultural  
products 
# coffee 
# gold 
# coffee 
# cashew nuts 
# coffee 
# fish and fish 
products 
# tea 
Imports 
# food and live  
animals 
# petroleum and  
petroleum products 
# chemicals 
# machinery and 
transportation 
equipment 
# petroleum products 
# motor vehicles 
# consumer goods 
# machinery and trans#
portation equipment 
# industrial raw  
materials, 
# capital equip#
ment 
# vehicles 
# petroleum 
Source: CIA, The World Factbook. 
 
 31 
 The contribution of agriculture to total output in sub#Saharan Africa has gen#
erally remained at similar levels since 1980. In 2006 the sector's contribution to 
GDP was about 19%. In contrast, the proportion of agriculture in East and 
South#East Asian economies fell significantly over the same period, owing to the 
increasing share of manufactures. Thus, sub#Saharan Africa has become the re#
gion in the developing world with the highest ratio of agriculture to GDP since 
2000, which reflects the lack of structural transformation (UNCTAD, 2008b)  
 The value of sub#Saharan African agricultural production remained stable be#
tween 1995 and 2000, while the nominal value of its agricultural exports de#
clined slightly from about USD16.6bn to USD14.7bn between 1995 and 2000, 
before rising to USD25.3bn in 2006 (UNCTAD, 2008b). However, as compared 
with the significant increases in the value of agricultural exports from Latin 
America and from East and South#East Asia, the increase in the value of sub#
Saharan African agricultural exports following liberalisation appears rather  
modest. 
 Two factors underpin this modest increase in value of sub#Saharan African 
agricultural exports. First, the recovery in agricultural production since 2000 
does not appear to have been widespread. Although there has been some ex#
pansion in agricultural exports from sub#Saharan Africa, the region's share of 
global exports has remained fairly small, with agricultural exports becoming 
concentrated in a small number of countries. Over the period 2002#2005, just 
three countries accounted for about 56% of total sub#Saharan African agricul#
tural exports, the largest exporter being South Africa, followed by Côte d'Ivoire 
and Ghana. Second, sub#Saharan Africa continues to depend on traditional non#
fuel primary commodity exports such as coffee, cotton, cocoa, tobacco, tea 
and sugar. Traditional commodities were the top exports of the region in value 
terms in 2000: this situation had not changed in 2005, although there were 
some changes in the rankings # only cotton was in the top three in both years # 
and, more importantly, in 2005 fewer countries exported the top four products. 
 This continuing dependence on traditional commodity exports also reflects 
the region's inability to tap fully into the international trade in 'market#dynamic' 
(non#traditional) commodities, such as horticulture and processed foods. In the 
period 2000#2005, no African country featured among the world's 20 leading 
exporters of processed food. However, Africa has made some progress in di#
versifying its international agricultural trade, although progress has been slow. A 
few (East African) countries have made inroads into the international trade in 
horticultural products. Kenya, for instance, exports considerable amounts of 
horticultural products, although less than 1% of the global market (OECD, 
2008), and also Ethiopia and Uganda have increased their exports of these 
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products, although these volumes are even smaller than those of Kenya. Finally, 
Africas share in world agricultural imports decreased steadily from 5.4% in 
1985 to 3.2% in 2006 (2008a). Whether this is a positive trend (Africa is less 
dependent on imports) or negative (African consumers have less variety; de#
pend more on domestic production) is not clear. 
 What is interesting, is that trade liberalisation has had little effect on intra#
African trade. Though there was a marked increase in the share of intra#African 
trade in the 1980s and early 1990s, it has remained essentially stable after#
wards. Official intraregional trade accounted for only 8% of total African exports 
in 2006 # a much lower figure than in other regions.1 This can be partly ex#
plained by tariff cuts, which reduce the preference margins given to other Afri#
can countries and therefore reduce the incentives for intraregional trade. 
However, there are also other reasons. First, the products that African countries 
export tend to be similar in nature, thereby limiting the complementarity of ex#
ports. Second, the infrastructure for intra#African trade is often poor, which 
leads to high transaction costs. And third, despite the many regional agree#
ments in place, these are generally slow to be implemented and there is little 
private sector involvement in them as compared with their equivalents in 
Europe, Latin America or Asia. 
 UNCTAD (2008a) states that trade liberalisation was expected to lead to in#
creased production of tradables, that is, increased exports and changes in the 
composition of such exports. Given the relative importance of agriculture in Af#
rican countries, one would therefore expect an increase in agricultural exports 
as well as some diversification into new agricultural exports. Trade liberalisation 
has created a price incentive structure which has contributed to some of the 
positive developments noted above. However, UNCTAD (ibid) concludes that the 
more successful agricultural exporters show that the main factors that underlie 
their performance, with the possible exception of the devaluation of the CFA 
franc, go beyond trade liberalisation and are the result of deliberate efforts by 
governments to develop the agricultural sector. It also concludes that contrary 
to the expectations of advocates of trade liberalisation who believed that agri#
cultural exports were constrained by misguided policies, such as the high taxa#
tion of agriculture, to promote import substitution industrialisation, African 
countries are more hampered by structural problems that afflict the agricultural 
sector in Africa. Trade liberalisation policies that reduced barriers to trade were 
not integrated with sectoral policies that could have addressed supply#side re#
sponse issues, thus preventing the region from attaining its full potential in agri#
                                                 
1 In reality, intra#regional trade may be much higher due to informal trade and smuggling. 
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cultural exports even within the context of improved macroeconomic fundamen#
tals. 
 
 
2.3 Regional trade agreements 
 
There are several regional trade agreements that Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda have joined. The East African Community (EAC) is an intergovernmental 
organisation comprising Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. The 
East African Community was revived on 30 November 1999, when the Treaty 
for its re#establishment was signed. It came into force on 7 July 2000. The 
Launch of the EAC Customs Union on 31 December 2004, marked the introduc#
tion of Common External tariffs and Internal Tariffs for Extra regional imports 
and intra#regional trade, respectively. The main goals of the East African Com#
munity Customs Union are: 
# Liberalising intra#regional trade in goods on the basis of mutually beneficial 
trade arrangements among the Partner States; 
# Promoting efficiency in production; 
# Enhancing domestic, cross border trade and foreign investment; 
# Promoting economic development and diversification as well as industrial#
isation. 
 
 The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) is a prefer#
ential trading area with nineteen member states. COMESA was established in 
December 1994, replacing a Preferential Trade Area which had existed since 
1981. Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia are members; Tanzania left in 2000 and is 
no longer a member. 
 The Africa Free Trade Zone (AFTZ) is a free trade zone announced at the 
EAC#SADC#COMESA Summit on Wednesday 22 October 2008 by the heads of 
Southern African Development Community (SADC), COMESA and EAC. The Afri#
can Free Trade Zone is also referred to as the African Free Trade Area. 
 These regional trade agreements aim to promote regional trade by develop#
ing an enabling environment for trade. For instance, in 2004, The Ministers of 
Agriculture at the meeting held in Nairobi in October 2004, issued the Nairobi 
Declaration on 'Expanding Opportunities for Agricultural Production, Enhanced 
Regional Food Security, Increased Regional Trade and Expanded Agro#Exports 
through Research, Value Addition and Trade Facilitation.'  
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They 'committed themselves and therefore the region, to moving away 
from a national to a regional approach to dealing with regional food se#
curity through the establishment of a regional food reserve and early 
warning system and removing all barriers to regional agricultural trade 
so that food crops and other agricultural commodities can move unim#
peded across the region from surplus to deficit areas to meet the food 
needs of our people taking due cognisance of the need to harmonise 
procedures while taking measures to guard against the spread of pests 
and diseases. […] The COMESA Trade and Customs Committee and 
subsequently, the Council of Ministers, fully endorsed the strategy of 
'Maize without Borders' whose key features are to remove barriers and 
facilitate cross#border movement of maize across the region. This is in 
recognition of the fact that maize is a key and strategic food crop whose 
availability equates to food security in most COMESA countries' 
(Miti, 2004).  
 
 However, Nyoro et al. (2007) describes how governments within the 
COMESA have since applied measures that have been in violation of the policies 
signed within these regional trade agreements. Such measures have involved 
export bans, import duties, purchases by government financed marketing 
boards and imposition of various non tariff barriers. Non#tariff barriers in the 
form of restrictive trade regulations and policies (described in Nyoro et al. ibid) 
have deterred regional trade. As a result, informal cross border trade has in#
creased, which has resulted in higher transaction costs. Non#tariff barriers also 
have discouraged the private sector from investing in the maize value chain. 
According to Nyoro et al. (ibid), food security in the region could be improved 
when countries would move away from a national perspective and adhere to the 
principles of the regional trade agreements. However, political economy issues 
such as national sovereignty explain why countries are hesitant to implement 
these principles. For instance, Kenya does not feel politically safe when relying 
on food supply entirely from other countries in the region. Considering that 
these other countries have often pursued policies such as export bans for cere#
als, the sentiment of Kenya (and other countries) may be appropriate.  
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3 Implicit agricultural taxation: distortions 
to agricultural incentives 
 
 
Governments have always intervened in food and other agricultural markets, 
particularly via trade policies. Governments establish various border and domes#
tic measures which have an immediate effect on consumer choices, producer 
resource allocation, and net farm incomes. Most commonly these are import or 
export taxes, subsidies and quantitative restrictions for farm and non#farm 
products, supplemented by direct domestic taxes or subsidies for farm outputs 
or inputs and food consumer subsidies or taxes (Anderson et al., 2008). The in#
centives faced by farmers are affected not only by direct protection or taxation 
of primary agricultural industries but also indirectly via policies assisting non#
agricultural industries, since the latter can have an offsetting effect by drawing 
resources away from farming. It is relative prices and hence relative rates of 
government assistance that affect producers' incentives. While those non#agri#
cultural measures may be of only minor importance in most developed countries 
today, they have been important in developing countries over the past decades.  
 Progress has been made over the past two or three decades by numerous 
countries in reducing those and associated anti#trade policy biases. However, 
many price distortions remain intersectorally as well as within the agricultural 
sector of low# and middle#income countries. Some governments provide explicit 
subsidies to selected food consumers, but often they are offset by implicit dis#
tortions to consumer prices via border measures such as taxes or quantitative 
restrictions on imports. In addition to the impact of own#country policies, farm 
earnings in developing countries are depressed by agricultural protection meas#
ures in other (especially high#income) countries which lower real prices of food, 
feed and fiber in international markets. This issue has escalated in recent years 
because of the Doha Development Agenda of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO): agricultural exporting countries are demanding large cuts to farm subsi#
dies and barriers to food imports in protective countries, as well as the removal 
of non#reciprocal preferential market access arrangements for former colonies 
under the Cotonou Agreement. (Anderson, 2009) 
 In this section, we will review the effects of these trade policies on the incen#
tives (income) of farmers. This will be based on the work done by the World 
Bank. The World Bank has done a large survey on (implicit) agricultural taxation 
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(World Bank, 2008a).1 This work has highlighted the fact that especially in de#
veloping countries, non#agricultural macro#economic policies indirectly impact 
agricultural and food markets. It examined both agricultural and non#agricultural 
policy measures including import and export taxes, subsidies and quantitative 
restrictions, plus domestic taxes or subsidies on farm outputs or inputs and 
consumer subsidies for food staples. 
 Agricultural price, trade and exchange rate policies have reduced the earn#
ings of African farmers. Macroeconomic policies historically taxed agriculture 
more than agricultural policies did, but both were important in poorer countries. 
In a study involving 21 African countries, Anderson and Masters (2008) find that 
African governments have removed many of their earlier anti#farm and anti#trade 
policy biases. Government policy bias against agriculture had worsened in the 
late 1960s and 1970s, primarily through increased taxation of exportable prod#
ucts. Reforms of the 1980s and 1990s reversed that trend, and average rates 
of agricultural taxation are now back to or below the levels of the early 1960s. 
Most of this gain has come from reduced taxation of farm exports. In figure 3.1 
the nominal rates of assistance for Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Tanzania are 
shown. Anti#agricultural (macro#economic) policies decreased, but still exist in 
Ethiopia and Tanzania. The nominal rate of assistance (NRA) to agriculture is the 
percentage by which government policies have raised gross returns to farmers 
above what they would be without the government's intervention. 
 Anderson and Masters (ibid) estimate that for 21 surveyed countries in Af#
rica, for 2000#2004, the burden of taxation averaged USD6bn per year or 
USD41 per person working in agriculture. Although this figure is much lower 
than its peak in late 1970s when it was USD10bn per year or USD134 per farm 
worker, it is still significantly larger than public investment or foreign aid into the 
sector. The continuing taxation in Africa contrasts with both Asia and Latin 
America, where the average agricultural NRAs reached zero by the early 21st 
century (although like Africa, those regions still have a wide dispersion of NRAs 
across products and countries). 
 
                                                 
1 See www.worldbank.org/agdistortions. 
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Figure 3.1 Nominal rate of assistance to agriculture in Kenya, Uganda, 
Ethiopia and Tanzania 1975579 and 200052004 
 %  
 
Source: World Bank (2008a). 
 
 Figure 3.2 shows that for some cereals (e.g. sorghum and wheat) the NRAs 
have been historically high denoting an implicit subsidy in Sub#Saharan Africa. 
For other cereals (e.g. maize and rice) there has been an implicit taxation in the 
late 1970s. In 2000#2004 these have been reduced. However, for export crops 
such as tea, coffee and cocoa # important crops in Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Tanzania # the implicit taxation was much more severe and is still high. Anderson 
and Master (ibid) therefore signal that African farmers have become less taxed 
in part because of the changing trade orientation of African agriculture. Reduced 
taxation of farmers has occurred in part because of a decline in the share of 
output that is exportable, and a corresponding rise in the share that is import#
competing. The rate of protection from imports for these products has fluctu#
ated but remains positive. This helps only the few farmers who are net sellers of 
the protected products, however, and does so in a way that is less efficient and 
less equitable than many other possible interventions. Anderson and Master 
conclude that trade restrictions continue to be Africas most important instru#
ments of agricultural intervention. Domestic taxes and subsidies on farm inputs 
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and outputs, and non#product specific assistance, are a small share of total dis#
tortions to farmer incentives in Africa. 
 
Figure 3.2  Nominal rate of assistance to cereals and export commodities 
in Africa 1975579 and 2000504 a) 
 
a) In percent, weighted average across 21 countries. Weight based on gross value of agricultural production at un#
distorted price, with each NRA (by country, by product) weighted by the country's value of production of that com#
modity in a given year.  
Source: World Bank (2008a). 
 
 It is interesting to point out the differences between Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia 
and Tanzania. The general anti#farm bias still exists in Ethiopia and especially in 
Tanzania. In Tanzania benefits in terms of less negative NRA measures have 
been achieved for coffee, cashew nuts, cotton and beans among major exports, 
and for food crops, but many the NRA measures for other export crops (such as 
tea and tobacco) appeared unchanged and still negative. This implies that for 
many cash crops, other distortions, due to high transport costs, marketing inef#
ficiencies and the prices paid to farmers, became worse. There is evidence that 
high transport costs are still a major distortion for export crops in the 2000s 
(Morrissey and Leyaro, 2007). 
 In Ethiopia, as in many other developing countries, exchange rate controls, 
prohibitive trade taxes, and agricultural price policies have historically been the 
main sources of distortions to agricultural incentives. All of these have changed 
significantly since the early 1990s. However, Rashid et al. (2007) suggest that 
three forms of distortions still persist: control over input markets, ad hoc gov#
ernment interventions in output (mainly cereal) markets, and disincentives 
through depressed prices due to the continued inflow of food aid. 
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 In Kenya the anti#farm and anti#trade biases have fluctuated considerably 
since the 1960s but has been mostly negative. Only recently it has improved. 
There are three periods during which tradable agriculture and the sector in gen#
eral had distinctly negative rates of assistance (the early 1970s, 1980s and 
1990s). In each of these periods the cause of the taxation on agriculture is an 
overvaluation of the Kenya Shilling. The severe drop in the NRA on output in the 
early 1990s reflects the additional effect of unusually high world prices for 
maize and tea that were not matched with increases in farm gate prices. Exces#
sive charges by parastatal marketing boards also contributed to negative NRAs 
in the 1980s and early 1990s (Winter#Nelson and Argwings#Kodhek, 2007). 
 The anti#farm bias in Uganda has been reduced to almost zero since the 
1980s. This is due to the predominance of largely non#traded food crops in 
Ugandas agricultural production, and the relatively small share of these crops 
which were marketed, with most production being for own consumption during 
this period. While the overall magnitude of the distortions remained low through#
out the period, the strong bias against export crops undoubtedly held back the 
development of the sector (Mathews et al., 2007). 
 Anderson (2009:3) poses the question:  
 
'If distortions to agricultural markets are so pervasive, and the reform of 
farm protection measures so elusive, there must be strong political 
economy reasons for such widespread interventional by governments.'  
 
 In seeking to explain public policy choices, Anderson assumes vested inter#
est groups are the units of analysis that compete by spending time, energy, and 
money on the production of pressure to influence both the design and the tacti#
cal implementation of policies. Thus both public and private sector agents are 
involved. Masters and Garcia (2010) have analysed the data of the World Bank 
(Agricultural Distortions project) and show that governments: 
1. tax agriculture in poorer countries and subsidise it in richer ones;  
2. tax both imports and exports more than non#tradable farm products; 
3. tax more/subsidise less where there is more land per capita.   
 However, they show that there are differences across continents in these 
tendencies.  
 The reasons behind these distortions can be found in political economy mo#
tives. Master and Garcia (2010) confirm the vested interest groups hypothesis 
by finding that larger groups obtain more favourable policies. They find rent#
seeking motives for trade policy. Countries with more checks and balances on 
the exercise of political power have fewer distortions. Governments with a small 
 40 
nonfarm tax base (e.g. most African developing countries) may have a stronger 
motive to tax agricultural imports and exports, or conversely governments with 
a larger tax base may be less constrained by fiscal concerns and hence freer to 
pursue other political goals. In fact, they find that import taxes are associated 
with revenue motives # so they are smaller when other revenues are available # 
but export taxes are not. They conclude that governments in lower#income 
countries actually destabilise domestic prices, relative to what those prices 
would be with freer trade, over the full time period of the data. A given policy 
may achieve short#term stability, but on average these policies are not (or per#
haps cannot be) sustained, leading to large price jumps when policies change. 
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4 The food crisis 
 
 
A dramatic increase in food prices was seen in 2007#2008 although prices have 
come down since (Figure 4.1).  
 
Figure 4.1 World price index data 199052008 for food, meat, dairy,  
cereals and oils 
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 These high food prices need to be put into perspective: prices for other 
commodities such as energy, metals and minerals and especially fertilisers, 
rose even more during the same period (Figure 4.2). 
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Figure 4.2 Price index of oil, food and other commodities  
199052008 a) 
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Source: World Bank (2008a). 
 
 It is important to note that several factors have caused the recent price fluc#
tuations. They reflect underlying trends in supply and demand for agricultural 
commodities that began more than a decade ago on the one hand and other 
developments that have occurred more recently on the other hand (Figure 4.3).  
 
Figure 4.3  Factors that caused price increase 199652008 
 
Source: Trostle (2008). 
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 Banse et al. (2008) point out that the high prices reflect a 'perfect storm' in 
which different factors have come together almost simultaneously, resulting in a 
peak in prices. In the course of 2008 prices started to decrease again. The de#
crease in prices partly reflected the recovery in supplies. Also the economic 
downturn and the crisis in global financial markets in October 2008, leading to 
the US dollar's renewed strength and declining energy prices were reflected in 
steep price falls in all grains. These developments led to a collapse of ocean 
freight rates to only a fraction of their mid#year peaks, further reducing grain 
import costs.  
 What is interesting to note, however, is that domestic prices in (east) African 
countries show a different pattern than world prices. Figure 2.7 shows the 
maize prices in East Africa and the world market price. Two observations come 
up. First, the world market price for maize has increased until mid#2008 but 
then decreased with almost 45% since its peak in June and 23% in total. The pri#
ces in the East African countries, by contrast, continued to increase (21% in 
Tanzania, 72% in Kenya, 69% in Uganda and 91% in Ethiopia). Second, domes#
tic prices in East Africa fluctuated more than the world market price. When the 
prices are tested for correlation, the prices of Nairobi and Uganda are highly 
correlated1 (0.923). The prices of Tanzania are also correlated with those of 
Kenya and Uganda but a bit less (0.623 and 0.621 respectively). The world 
prices are also correlated with domestic prices (0.626, 0.501 and 0.586 for 
Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania respectively) but less than the prices of neighbour#
ing countries. The conclusion is that domestic prices in the four East African 
countries correlate more with each other than with world prices. 
 Domestic prices are only partly influenced by world market prices and are 
highly influenced by domestic supply (during bimodal harvest seasons) and  
regional trade. A study by Dembélé et al. (2008) shows that cereal prices in 
several West African markets seemed to be isolated from world prices: the do#
mestic situation in terms of production and those of neighbouring markets ex#
plain much of the price fluctuations in these countries. Two FARM publications 
(Daviron et al., 2008; Diarra, 2008) investigated how (fluctuating) international 
prices were transmitted to (West) African markets. The studies find that be#
tween 1994 and 2007, import of cereals had a 'stabilising effect' on the do#
mestic cereal prices: without imports, domestic prices fluctuate much more. 
The sharp increase of cereal prices in 2007/2008 was transmitted mostly to 
consumer prices, but in a diminished manner (a sharp increase in cereal prices 
                                                 
1 Correlations are all significant at the 0.01 level. 
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did not lead to a similar sharp increase in consumer prices, but a more moder#
ated increase). 
 
Figure 4.4 Maize prices in East Africa and world price 200752009 
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 At the beginning of 2009, the Red Cross1 warned of an 'exceptional food 
crisis' in East Africa. Several regions were worn down by successive droughts, 
years of poverty and conflict, but the situation in 2009 was even more complex 
than usual because of an increased vulnerability brought about by the instability 
in global markets and the major increase in cost of food cereals. Countries in 
East Africa usually import cereals to meet the needs of the population, but the 
high cost of food internationally exacerbated an already extreme situation. 
Therefore, the humanitarian crisis that had its roots in 2007#08 continued into 
2009. In East Africa, the share of household income spent on food is generally 
high (Table 4.1), from 35.8% in urban areas in Kenya to 67% in rural areas in 
Tanzania. 
                                                 
1 ReliefWeb: available at tinyurl.com/ce3w2b, accessed on 16/03/09. 
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Table 4.1 Food expenditure as % total income 
   National Rural Urban 
Ethiopia 2004 50.84 54.26 38.4 
Kenya 2006 45.8 58.2 35.8 
Tanzania  2000 65.4 67 60.2 
Uganda 2002 44 49 32 
Source: FAO (2009), Food Security Statistics available at tinyurl.com/dmzlql, accessed on 10/04/09. 
 
 Table 4.1 makes clear that food prices are a sensitive issue in these coun#
tries: rising food prices will affect households immediately. Maize is the key sta#
ple food crop in the East Africa and its availability in most countries is equated 
to food security. Even cereal producers in these areas are usually net buyers. 
Only a relatively small share is net seller and will profit from high prices (Ta#
ble 4.2).  
 
Table 4.2 Share of net food/maize sellers in Ethiopia, Kenya and  
Tanzania a) 
Country Year Crop % net sellers Source 
Ethiopia  2000 Maize 23 Jayne et al. (2006) 
Kenya  2001 Maize 32 Jayne et al. (2001) 
Tanzania  2003 Food 33 Sarris et al. (2006) 
a) Data for Uganda not found. 
 
 The regions' maize demand and supply is characterised by an annual varia#
tion of deficits and surpluses (Figure 4.5). Kenya and Tanzania, especially, but 
also Ethiopia, are not self#sufficient in maize every year and hence frequently 
depend on imports. In contrast, Uganda mostly produces a surplus in maize and 
can therefore export part of it. 
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Figure 4.5 Maize production net of consumption (food) 199752003 
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 Figure 4.5 already indicates that countries such as Kenya and Tanzania, 
which occasionally need to import maize to fulfil domestic consumption, are 
more vulnerable to high international prices than for instance Uganda, which 
generally can fulfil its domestic maize consumption by domestic production.  
 Figure 4.6 gives an overview of the steps that governments in the world 
have taken to reduce high food prices. In general, national policy responses to 
soaring food prices have varied in nature and effectiveness, but the focus has 
been on guaranteeing an adequate and affordable food supply for the majority 
of consumers, providing safety nets for the most food insecure and vulnerable 
and, to a much lesser degree, fostering agricultural supply response (FAO, 
2008).  
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Figure 4.6  Government responses to the high food prices per region 
 
Source: FAO (2008). 
 
 Some policies can have adverse effects (Von Braun, 2008; FAO, 2008). 
First, policy responses such as export bans or high export tariffs may reduce 
risks of food shortages in the short term for the relevant country, but they are 
likely to backfire by making the international market smaller and more volatile. 
Export restrictions can have harmful effects on import#dependent trading part#
ners # the 'beggar thy neighbour' effect.1 While such barriers sometimes help to 
contain pressures on domestic prices, they can also signal problems and lead 
to panic buying on domestic markets. On the other hand, in some countries 
where the barriers have been put into place, farmers reduced planting of cere#
als in the face of low domestic prices for their products coupled with high prices 
for inputs such as fuel, seeds and fertilisers. Second, price controls can fail by 
reducing farmers' incentives to produce more food and diverting resources 
away from those who need them most. Third, by reducing import barriers # in 
principle a welcome move toward more open trade # countries have put upward 
pressure on prices by expanding global food demand.  
 
                                                 
1 Beggar#thy#neighbour policies are those that seek benefits for one country at the expense of others. 
Such policies attempt to remedy the economic problems in one country by means which tend to 
worsen the problems of other countries. 
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5 Kenya: government responses to high 
cereal prices 
 
 
5.1 Background: conflict leading to failed harvests 
 
At the beginning of 2008, violence broke out as a result of contested national 
election results in Kenya, especially in Western and Nyanza provinces in South#
west Kenya. The FAO reported in February 20081 that the political unrest dis#
placed about 600,000 and killed nearly a thousand people. The crisis disrupted 
markets, destroyed businesses and has been a blow to the tourism sector. Ad#
ditionally, rains were poor in October to December 2007, which led to the fail#
ure of the secondary season cereal harvest in January 2008 in the southeast, 
and to increased food insecurity in northern and southern pastoral areas. The 
Southeast is one of Kenya's main growing areas. FEWSNET2 indicated that na#
tional maize production in the 2008 long rains season was expected to be 
about 12% less than in 2007 due to crop losses of 60% in the central highlands 
and marginal agricultural areas. In addition, high fertiliser prices led to a nearly 
30% increase in the costs of production and subsequent lower applications of 
fertilisers and a 10% decline in the area planted to maize. However, the rise in 
food prices after the post#election crisis did lead to an expansion in maize plant#
ing in Nyanza Province, which was expected to offset some of the expected 
production declines. 
 As a result, the total maize production in 2008 was 29% lower than 2006 
and 22% lower than 2007 (RATIN, 2009).3 Beginning of 2009, the situation did 
not yet improve much. An estimated 2.34m MT national maize output for the 
2008/2009 production season was anticipated, which is about 15% lower than 
the short#term average and could be even lower, once the extent of the 
2008/2009 short#rains crop failure is fully evaluated (FEWSNET, 2009).4 By 
January 2009, the President of Kenya declared the food shortage which threat#
ened the lives of approximately 10m people a national disaster (RATIN, 2009; 
Figure 5.1). 
 
                                                 
1 FAO Special Alert No. 324 # 14 Feb 2008. tinyurl.com/cw83ut, accessed on 13#03#09. 
2 FEWSNET Kenya Food Security Update July 2008. tinyurl.com/d86tce, accessed on 13#03#09. 
3 www.ratin.net, accessed on 13#03#09. 
4 FEWSNET, 2009 February update. tinyurl.com/de7gyn, accessed on 13#03#09. 
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Figure 5.1 Projected, most likely food security conditions in Kenya, 
2nd Quarter 2009 (April5June) 
 
Source: FEWSNET (2009), accessed 16#07#09, FEWSNET Kenya Food Security Update July 2008. tiny#
url.com/d86tce, accessed on 16#07#09. tinyurl.com/dxgyul, accessed on 06#04#09. 
 
 
5.2 Cross5border trade 
 
Cross#border trade for maize has been an important source of supply for the 
domestic market of Kenya (Figure 5.2). In the period in which maize prices rose 
in Kenya, imports from neighbouring countries Tanzania and Uganda peaked. 
However, Kenya has also relied heavily on imported maize from South Africa 
and the United States of America. The main sources of wheat have been the US, 
Australia, Russia and Europe, while the main source of maize has been South 
Africa with some additional from the US (RATIN, 2009). 1 
 
                                                 
1
 tinyurl.com/dxgyul, accessed on 06#04#09. 
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Figure 5.2  Cross5border trade between Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda 
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Source: RATIN (2009).1 
 
 This figure however does not include Sudan, which has been a major im#
porter of cereals as well during the same period, due to its humanitarian crisis. 
 
 
5.3 Prices 
 
5.3.1 General 
 
According to the IMF (2008a:4), growth in Kenya rebounded strongly over the 
five#year period preceding the election crisis that erupted at the end of 2007.  
                                                 
1 tinyurl.com/ddqg86, accessed on 15#01#09. 
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However:  
 
'Political instability took a toll on economic activity and exacerbated infla#
tionary pressures in early 2008. First quarter GDP contracted by 1.3% 
(year#on#year), with tourist arrivals down by over 50% and most sectors 
hampered by disruptions to supply chains and displacement of produc#
tive resources. The resulting shortages compounded inflation pressures 
arising from an earlier accommodative monetary policy as well as from 
rising international fuel and food prices. Inflation for the official headline 
consumer price index (CPI) was 26.5% in July [2008] (year#on#year); and 
even if the index appears to overstate inflation.' 
 
Figure 5.3 Inflation Kenya (average consumer prices, annual percent 
change 199852009) 
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Source: IMF (2008). 
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5.3.2 Cereal prices 
 
Maize prices rose with 69% in 2008 (Figure 5.4). As was discussed in the previ#
ous chapter, the high prices were caused by a combination of factors, amongst 
which a shortfall in domestic supply and high input prices. The shortfall in  
domestic supply was caused by unreliable rainfall, reduced acreage and low 
yields due to the political unrests. 
 
Figure 5.4 Maize prices in Kenya (Nairobi), January 20075July 2009 
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Source: RATIN (2009).1 
 
                                                 
1 RATIN Prices at www.ratin.com, accessed on 16#07#09. 
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Figure 5.5 Regional maize prices in Kenya, January 20075 
February 2009 
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Source: Regional Agricultural Trade Intelligence Network (RATIN) (2009).1 
 
 Figure 5.5 shows that when prices started increasing, the differences be#
tween regional prices also started diverging. Prices differ with 70% in some  
instances (e.g. December 2008). This is an indication that markets were func#
tioning less efficiently. When high prices are a result of relative shortages, and 
low prices of relative surpluses, one would expect trade between the two re#
gions and subsequently converging prices. Figure 5.6 shows the marketplaces 
that are mentioned in Figure 5.5 (underlined). It is expected that the price differ#
ences will be greater for places that are more remote (e.g. in North Kenya).  
 
                                                 
1 Ratin Prices at www.ratin.com, accessed on 16#07#09 
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Figure 5.6  Trade routes and places in Kenya (first season maize) a) 
 
a) Those that are underlined are mentioned in Figure 5.5. 
Source: Fews Net (2009).1 
 
 
5.4 Government policies 
 
In 2008, Kenya had a maize shortfall of approximately 270,000 tonnes, which 
the Government tried to cover by supplying millers with maize stocks held by 
the National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB) purchased from the previous 
seasons. In addition, the Government imported about 140,000 tonnes to in#
crease the strategic grain reserve. Even with this arrangement, the maize sup#
ply was still not adequate with many maize processors struggling to procure 
maize for daily milling (RATIN, 2008).2
                                                 
1 tinyurl.com/c8na4o. 
2 RATIN East Africa Food and Trade Bulletin, Sept '08 (No. 50) at tinyurl.com/mogzvq, accessed on 
March 2009. 
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 In June 2008, the government removed sales tax on rice and bread and re#
duced import tax on wheat to reduce consumer prices. However, prices contin#
ued to rise and the government felt compelled to take further measures. While 
in December 2008 a 2#kg bag of maize was selling at KES120, the government 
made an agreement with millers to lower the price of a bag to KES65#72. How#
ever, there were dissenting voices in the governing coalition party warning that 
these price reductions were not enough (BBC, 2 December 2008).1  
 Confusion about the official government policies also ensued. In December 
2008, the Agriculture Minister William Ruto stated that the Treasury had re#
leased KES1bn on 9 December 2008 for the NCPB to buy maize from farmers 
and to resell this to millers at a subsidised price. According to the directive is#
sued by Ruto and Prime Minister Raila Odinga, the NCPB would buy maize from 
farmers at KES1,950 per 90#kg bag (KES43.3 per 2#kg bag) and then sell it to 
millers at KES1,750 (KES38.9 per 2#kg bag). Low income earners could then 
buy a 2#kg bag of maize at a reduced price of KES52 in areas such as Kibera 
and Kangemi while flour would be sold at KES72 per 2#kg bag for the middle#
income people. The acting Finance Minister John Michuki however, declared that 
he did not know where the money for the subsidy would come from (Nairobi 
Star, 10 December 2008).2 
 The Kenya government announced two different prices for maize: one for 
the poor, the other for the middle class. The government would sell 'govern#
ment#branded maize meal' to the poor using a chain of government regulated 
retail outlets at KES52 per 2#kg bag. However, the opposition party Orange 
Democratic Movement (Jakoyo Midiwo) claimed that consumers could only af#
ford to pay KES40, thus pressuring the government to take even more action. 
Much criticism was also directed at the price system, because there was no 
guarantee that only the poor would buy the cheap, 'government#branded' maize. 
Entrepreneurs could obtain the cheap maize at KES52 per 2#kg bag and then 
supply it to upper#income retail outlets at KES72, thereby making a huge profit 
(BBC 2 December 2008; Nairobi Chronicle, 2 December 2008).3 The govern#
ment tried to avoid this by introducing prices of KES72 in urban areas and 
KES52 in rural areas.  
 Confusion also marked the distribution of the subsidised maize flour. Millers 
across the country said they had little information about how the flour was to be 
distributed. They said their contract with the Government entailed milling the 
                                                 
1 tinyurl.com/c5sc5c, accessed on January 2009. 
2 tinyurl.com/cgay5u. 
3 tinyurl.com/c5sc5c and tinyurl.com/dftwc5. 
 56 
new brand and handing it over to the cereals board. Supermarkets too were not 
sure whether they would be asked to sell the flour. Prime Minister Raila Odinga 
had indicated that the flour would be sold in low#income areas, but that consum#
ers from other areas were also free to buy it. Agricultural Minister Ruto said the 
maize flour would be distributed by the cereals board. When key Government of#
ficials met millers for talks on how to reduce maize flour prices, they agreed 
that the new brand would be distributed to areas such as slums where the ma#
jority of poor Kenyans live. However, Mr Ruto said that the flour would also be 
available in supermarkets (Daily Nation, 9 December 2008).1 
 The government decided to implement further price controls by forcing 
farmers to sell to the National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB) at KES1,950 
for a 90#kg bag (or KES43.3 for a 2#kg bag) and banning maize millers from 
buying the commodity directly from farmers. As would be expected, the Kenya 
National Federation of Agricultural Producers (Kenfap) and the Cereals Growers 
Association (CGA) opposed this move, blaming the Government for distorting 
the market by imposing price controls on maize. Kenfap Chairman Nduati 
Kariuki said maize trade was liberalised almost a decade ago and the Govern#
ment should respect that policy decision. Farmers demanded to receive at least 
KES2,360 per 90#kg bag (or KES52.4 per 2#kg bag) (The Standard, 8 Decem#
ber 2008)2 which is much higher than consumers were reported to be able to 
pay. It was also reported that the government imported maize at KES3,000 per 
90#kg bag (Capital News, 8 December 2008).3 There were reports that some 
farmers or companies knew ahead of time about changes in government policy 
and sold maize in neighbouring countries ahead of the November ban on maize 
and maize product exports (Associate Press, 16 January 2009).4 Therefore the 
government policy may have contributed to a further shortage of maize supply 
on Kenyas market. 
 At the same time the price controls were introduced, rumours of corruption 
emerged. Investigations by newspaper the Daily Nation indicated that the politi#
cians have been buying maize from the NCPB and selling it to millers at exorbi#
tant prices. In November 2008 there were accusations that letters from the 
Ministry of Agriculture were being used by a cartel consisting of involving senior 
politicians and businessmen to authorise the purchase of maize from the NCPB. 
Reportedly, the cartel later resold the maize to millers at a higher price (Daily 
                                                 
1 tinyurl.com/m7nwj2. 
2 tinyurl.com/czzqze. 
3 tinyurl.com/cj8nyb. 
4 tinyurl.com/d83y4d. 
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Nation, 24 November 2008).1 There were also accusations that the Ministry of 
Agriculture had provided 400,000 bags of maize to a cartel of millers without 
charge. In November 2008, four millers had been contracted to mill the maize 
on the government's behalf and return this for distribution. Critics said that se#
lection of the millers had been done without any competitive bidding. Agriculture 
permanent secretary Dr Romano Kiome confirmed that the government was yet 
to conclude a list of stockists to sell the low#cost flour. He defended the selec#
tion saying that those chosen had 'voluntarily' agreed to make available 30% of 
their milling capacity to the project. He said the government was still registering 
more millers for the service (Daily Nation, 13 December 2008).2 
 Furthermore, some million bags of maize seemed to be missing from the 
NCPB stores, fuelling suspicions that the grain may have been stolen from these 
stores and sold. Data from the NCPB showed that the Board had in store 2.6m 
bags of maize in June 2008. However, Mr Ruto had informed the House of Par#
liament that the maize in the stores at the time was 1.6m bags (Daily Nation, 
5 February 2009).3 On 26 January, Agriculture Minister William Ruto dissolved 
the entire of NCPB board and sacked 12 top managers, as he sought to im#
prove efficiency at the board (Capital News, 29 January 2009).4 The Grain Bulk 
Handlers limited (GBHL) also came under fire, being accused of inefficiency by 
delaying deliveries of maize (KBC, 20 January 2009).5 
 The Kenyan media also carried reports about corruption with respect to ex#
ports to neighbouring southern Sudan of maize imported by Kenya. Maize pur#
chased from the NCPB by millers and middlemen at a price of KES1,750 per 
90#kg bag, was sold to Sudan at about KES6,000 by middlemen. On top of this, 
the Justice and Constitutional Affairs Minister Martha Karua accused agriculture 
ministry officials for illegally buying large quantities of imported maize and re#
selling it on the Kenyan market for a commission.  
 Although Kenyas Minister for Agriculture William Ruto denied all charges, 
Kenyas anti#corruption authority opened an investigation into the suspected em#
bezzling of large quantities of maize in January 2009. (AFP, 13 January 2009; 
Muigwithania 2.0, 13 January 2009).6 In July 2009 twenty#four politicians were 
cleared of charges of corruption in the maize scandal. A Kenya Anti#Corruption 
Commission report stated that 21 MPs and three ministers (including Ruto) who 
                                                 
1 tinyurl.com/d7agk8. 
2 tinyurl.com/cv9c46. 
3 tinyurl.com/nkvhex. 
4 tinyurl.com/d4mevm. 
5 tinyurl.com/dzvkvp. 
6 tinyurl.com/c7b94v and tinyurl.com/cpdkx4. 
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were accused of writing notes to the management of the national cereals stores 
for maize allocation had not committed any crime (Daily Nation, 13 July 2009).1  
 At the end of January 2009, the government agreed to buy maize from 
farmers at KES2,300 up from KES1,950 per bag. The decision made after a 
consultation meeting between the government and representatives of the Cere#
als Growers Association. The arrangement would be effective in February and 
March once it is approved by parliament KBC, 28 January 2009).2 This came af#
ter reports that farmers in the North Rift region are holding on to their maize 
stocks in anticipation of better prices as most supermarkets in Mombasa run 
out of maize flour stocks. Farmers hope that the government through the Na#
tional Cereals and Produce Board will review their prices upwards from the cur#
rent KES1,950. It is also claimed that some millers are hoarding their stocks in 
anticipation of a price increase. Where it is available a 2#kg packet of maize 
flour is being sold at KES112 and limited to two packets per shopper at a time 
(KBC, 27 January 2009).3 
 The government also waived import duties. Finance Minister Uhuru Kenyatta 
said maize imported between 16 January and 16 July will be cleared through 
customs without payment. The move, he said, is aimed at ending the artificial 
shortage created by the alleged mismanagement of maize stocks by the board 
and politicians (Afrol News, 27 January 2008).4  
 In March 2009, the government of Kenya said it would subsidise fertiliser 
prices. DAP fertiliser will be sold at a reduced price of KES2,500 while CAN fer#
tiliser will retail at KES1,650 per 50#kg bag from a high of KES6,000. President 
Kibaki stated that  
 
'It is for this reason that the Government has taken over procurement of 
40% of the national fertiliser requirement. This will cost KES6.2bn, ex#
cluding the Tea fertiliser being bought by KTDA for KES1.6bn. The total 
amount of fertiliser to be procured by the Government and the KTDA will 
be 163,000 tons' (Government of Kenya, March 11, 2009).5 
 
 The measures taken by the government have failed to bring down maize 
prices (Figure 5.4), but might have stabilised them. By mid#2009, the Cereal 
Millers Association (CSA) stated that prices stabilised at around KES80 per 2#kg 
                                                 
1 tinyurl.com/krxxyp. 
2 tinyurl.com/cz2oku.  
3 tinyurl.com/c8xrsv. 
4 tinyurl.com/dl8vje. 
5 Available at ReliefWeb, tinyurl.com/csxo37, accessed on 16#03#09. 
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packet of maize flour as a result of availability and adequate supplies of maize 
through importation. The CSA also indicated that prices would only decrease as 
a result of good harvests (Daily Nation, 15 July 2009).1 The government, in the 
meantime, was making plans to fix the prices of fuel and several basic food 
commodities, including maize and maize flour. The business community warned 
that these price controls could lead to shortages:  
 
'Unless the state wants to start trading, no miller will import maize or 
wheat at a higher price and sell flour at a loss,' he said. Already wheat 
farmers were demanding KES3,500 per bag, way above the price set by 
the cereals board.' (Daily Nation, 23 June 2009).2 
 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
 
Maize prices started to rise in Kenya mid#2008 and have remained high since. 
The main reason for this is reduced supply, which had several causes. Because 
maize is an important food crop, the reduced supply and subsequent high 
prices have led to a situation of food insecurity problems in large parts of the 
country. Three reasons underlie the high prices. First, a lack of rains or late 
rains has led to failed or reduced harvests in several harvest seasons in parts of 
the country. Second, the food situation was severely affected by the contested 
election results at the end of 2007 which led to riots, violence and displacement 
of people, notably in one of the main maize producing areas of Kenya. Third, 
because international prices were high in 2008, the Kenyan government faced 
high maize import costs.  
 These three underlying problems, however, were compounded by the gov#
ernment activities. The government that was dealing with high prices, mounting 
food insecurity and increasing protests over these, was the outcome of long 
negotiations between two contesting parties.3 The National Accord and Recon#
ciliation Act 2008 provided a possibility for power#sharing, with Kibaki remaining 
President and Raila Odinga taking a newly re#created post of Prime Minister. 
However, as news reports show, the members of the two parties that now form 
a government still do not trust each other. There were several accusations of 
corruption (which may be in fact founded, as Kenya is becoming increasingly 
                                                 
1 tinyurl.com/ktnxje. 
2 tinyurl.com/lokh9e.  
3 Namely the Party for National Unity led by Mwai Kibaki and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) 
led by Mr Raila Odinga. 
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corrupt)1 and ethnic lineage, which played a major role in and after the elections 
remain an important factor.2 Thus, a divided government has been in power in 
Kenya which has not been able to tackle the problem of high maize prices in a 
unified and consistent manner.  
 The government also has been too directly involved trying to curb prices, in#
stead of tackling the root causes of reduced maize supply. The East African 
Grains Council (EAGC, 2009) has criticised the Kenyan government for too 
many direct interventions into the maize markets and has advocated more sup#
port to the private sector. The policy measures that the government takes need 
to be temporary and backed up by measures to stimulate the sector. According 
to the EAGC, the willingness of the private sector to invest in the maize value 
chain (supply of inputs, production, post#harvest handling infrastructure, proc#
essing and logistics) is linked to free market policies.  
 A consultative meeting held by EAGC for its Kenyan members made the fol#
lowing recommendations for sustainable structured maize trade (EAGC, 2009). 
These recommendations include that the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) should es#
tablish a Public/Private sector grain consultative forum to be able to quickly de#
termine the available stocks and shortfalls and to ensure grain forecasting and 
preparation of a national balance sheet. They also include that all traders, mill#
ers and the NCPB should be able to purchase maize from the farmers at market 
prices and that the 'City Council Cess' (tax) on maize which is currently KES40 
per bag should be removed as this cost is passed on to consumers. The EACG 
advocated that the government should uphold free market principles and focus 
on faster availability of market information and a price discovery mechanism so 
that information on price, quality, quantity, location of where maize is available. 
The government should further work on regional mechanisms (e.g. accurate 
capture of available regional maize stock # regional maize balance sheet; re#
gional crop forecasting system, harmonisation of COMESA and EAC maize 
standards). 
 The list of the EAGC makes clear that there is much more that the Kenyan 
government could do to support the private sector. Several of these recom#
mendations are related to in reducing transaction costs and risks, such as mar#
                                                 
1 A study released by Transparency International July 2009 shows corruption index rising in virtually 
all the institutions, including the parliament (Press Release TI Kenya, 02 July 2009. Available at  
tinyurl.com/m4y734). 
2 The fact, for instance, that the minister accused of corruption (Ruto) was from the Kalenjin ethnic 
group was an important factor in the media discussing his position. See for instance The Standard, 
13 July 2009 available at tinyurl.com/nlo7jb. Ruto, a member of the ODM, was also accused of  
delivering hate speeches in the run#up to the 2007 elections (Time, 30 January 2008 at tinyurl.com/ 
mmejq2). 
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ket information and price discovery mechanisms, establishing of a regional crop 
forecasting system. The Cereal Millers Association, for instance, blames the 
government for not responding adequately early by importing sufficient amounts 
of grain (World Grain, 2009). 
 Some international donors have pointed out that corruption has aggravated 
the problems in Kenya. The German ambassador, echoing the concerns of other 
diplomats said in January 2009 that Kenya should pursue reports of corruption. 
The U.S. Ambassador has said Kenyan government policies such as requiring 
farmers to only sell their produce to the government and targeted price controls  
 
'have indirectly contributed to shortages and in addition have inadver#
tently perhaps contributed to reports of corruption' (The Standard 
27 January 2009).1  
 
 When taking a political economy perspective, the actions of the government 
can be understood. As Holmén (2005) explaines, the priorities made by the  
government and market actors are usually not primarily determined by the 
needs of farmers but rather by how governmental and market actors perceive  
their own situations and survival options. This applies especially to the Kenyan 
government, which is composed by two opposing factions. Political reasons, 
winning votes by showing that one of the two political factions is doing a better 
job in tackling the food crisis in the short term than the other are powerful moti#
vations.  
 
                                                 
1 tinyurl.com/nspmlz. 
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6 Tanzania: government responses to 
high cereal prices 
 
 
6.1 Background: normal harvests and food security 
 
The food security situation in Tanzania was not as dire as in Kenya (Figure 6.1) 
but also in Tanzania a large part of the country was moderately food insecure. 
This had its roots in several poor harvests. The harvesting of the 2007/2008 
short rainfall ('vuli') season crops, which accounts for some 30% of annual food 
supplies was below average, due to poor rains. However, the food supply situa#
tion remained generally satisfactory throughout the country with the exception 
of some areas in the region of Arusha and Iringa where food shortages were re#
ported, mainly due to a volcano eruption on Mount Oldongai and fire disaster 
(FAO Crop Prospects and Food Situation, No 2, April 2008).1 
 There were normal rains in mid#2008 leading to good harvests of main 
coarse grain crops (mostly maize). Tanzanias 2008/2009 short rainfall (vuli) 
season was poor again and affected several regions (Mwana, Shinyanga, Kil#
manjaro, Dodoma, Singida, and the northern coast (Figure 6.1). However, the 
food security impacts in these areas were expected to be much less severe 
than in Kenya because Tanzanian grain reserves were better supplied and be#
cause households in these areas are much less dependent on the vuli rains har#
vest than the farmers in Kenya. By the end of 2008, an estimated 240,544 
people were reported to be food insecure (FEWSNET, 2009).2  
The food security situation as in Figure 6.1 remained largely unchanged by July 
2009 (FEWSNET, 2009).3 However, prospects for 2009 were not encouraging. 
The north#east regions of Tanzania continued to receive below#average rainfall 
for the duration of the main ('masika') season (March#June). Average rainfall in 
unimodal regions from April to May improved production prospects. However, 
limited input utilisation, due to the high fertiliser costs, were likely to lead to 
lower yields. Furthermore, in the south#east, poor localised rains in Lindi and 
Mtwara districts were expected to reduce the cereal harvest (FAO, 2009).4 
                                                 
1 tinyurl.com/dyrvzw, accessed on 19/03/09. 
2 Executive Overview of Food Security January 28 at tinyurl.com/chqan2, accessed on 20/03/09. 
3 tinyurl.com/dkdgn5. 
4 FAO Crop Prospects and Food Situation, no 3, July 2009. tinyurl.com/kwj27p, accessed on  
17#07#09. 
 63 
 
Figure 6.1 Food security status Tanzania January 2009 a) 
 
a) It is notable that the administrative border between Kenya and Tanzania is so visible in the food security status. 
This reflects the effect of the policies pursued by the Tanzanian and Kenyan governments. 
Source: FEWSNET (2009).1
 
 
  
 
6.2 Prices 
 
6.2.1 General 
 
Inflation in Tanzania decreased from 1998 until 2004, after which it increased 
quite sharply. However, inflation figures were much higher before 1998 (from 
1990#1997 the average inflation was 24%). The Tanzanian economy continued 
to perform well and economic growth exceeded 7% in 2007/08 (July#June). In#
flation has risen to 11.8% by October 2008, which mainly reflected the surge in 
global food and fuel prices. Beyond the lagged impact of the sharp rise in global 
food and fuel prices, a rapid expansion in liquidity driven by a surge in govern#
ment spending added to inflation pressures (IMF 2009a). 
 
                                                 
1 Executive Overview of Food Security Special Focus: Kenya and Tanzania January 28. tinyurl.com/ 
chqan2, accessed on 20/03/09. 
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Figure 6.2 Inflation Tanzania (average consumer prices annual percent 
change 199852009) 
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Source: IMF (2009). 
 
6.2.2 Cereal prices 
 
Maize prices in Tanzania started rising relatively early in mid#2007 and peaked 
in January 2008, after which they came down again until mid#2008, after which 
they rose again (Figure 6.3). Prices in 2008 were on a significantly higher level 
than those in 2007 and remained high in 2009. 
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Figure 6.3 Maize prices (in USD per tonne) 20075mid52009  
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Source: RATIN (2009). 
 
 The first half of 2007 was characterised by favourable food security condi#
tion. Wholesale maize prices increased moderately between June and July on 
some markets, but this increased was seasonal and reflected normal flows of 
grain from surplus to deficit areas. During the second half of 2007 prices began 
to increase very rapidly. This was attributed to a number of factors, including:  
# High fuel costs that have resulted in increased transport costs;  
# Campaigns to standardise the weights of bags sold by farmers;  
# Excessive crop sales during the harvest, which depletes stocks in the areas;  
# The upcoming cashew season that increases the purchasing power of the 
residents, causing traders to take advantage of the situation and increase 
prices. 
Source: FEWSNET (2007).1 
 
 In 2008, prices of staple commodities (including maize) declined in response 
to good unimodal harvests, as well the export ban that the government imposed 
to provide some relief from high prices for poor urban populations. However, 
                                                 
1 Tanzania Food Security Update August at tinyurl.com/dy8nqj, accessed on 20/03/09. 
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the prices remained significantly above those of 2007 and those of the five#year 
average, particularly in urban markets like Dar es Salaam and Arusha 
(FEWSNET, 2008).1 This suggests that a supply response by Tanzanian farmers 
to high and increasing food prices was insufficient to countervail all of the fac#
tors that pushed prices up. These factors were attributed to high fuel and trans#
portation costs as well as speculation (although this is difficult to prove). The 
continuation of high levels also suggests that the market interventions imposed 
by the government such as export restrictions and import subsidies reduced 
market prices only marginally (FEWSNET, 2008).2  
 By mid#2008, grain stocks were also running low, which made prices seem 
more volatile than normal and which was another factor contributing to the in#
crease in prices. By January 2009, prices in Tanzania had reached another 
peak. Because the October#December 2008 harvest in Kenya was low, it meant 
that adjacent areas in Tanzania, which usually import maize from Kenya, could 
not do so in January 2009, further tightening supplies. The other factors that 
have kept an upward pressure on prices in Tanzania during 2008 included as 
fuel prices, transport costs, and costs of other inputs, which continue to per#
sist. As a result of this tightening of supplies and rising prices, up to 250,000 
people in about 20 districts were considered food insecure (FEWSNET, 2009).3  
 Despite the export ban, sources suspect that the little maize grain reserves 
could also be vacuuming to Southern Sudan via Kenya, where a bag of maize 
retails at higher prices than in Tanzania. Kenyan and Tanzanian traders were re#
ported to be buying large consignments of maize from Tanzania farmers, taking 
the consignment via Panya#routes4 to Kenya where they get transported to Su#
dan where maize is the new 'gold'. 
 
 
6.3 Government policies 
 
In order to stabilise cereal availability and prices, the government of Tanzania 
enforced a cereal export ban in January 2008. Maize imports became exempt 
from import duties in March 2008 to increase cereal availability. However, unof#
ficial exports continued and nominal prices remained about 80% above the 
                                                 
1 East Africa Regional Food Security Update June. tinyurl.com/d6rwsg, accessed on 19/03/09. 
2 East Africa Regional Food Security Update: Staple food prices July. tinyurl.com/cvfgc4. accessed 
on 20/03/09. 
3 East Africa Regional Food Security Update: Focus: Regional markets and food prices January.  
tinyurl.com/dedcpd. 
4 Panya is Kiswahili for mouse. Panya routes are smuggling routes. 
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2003#07 average in May 2008 (FEWSNET, 2008).1 In a further effort to limit the 
price increases, and to mitigate the effects of the localised food shortages, the 
government authorised the imports of around 300,000 tonnes of maize duty#
free and imposed an export ban on all agricultural commodities (FAO, 2008).2 
By the end of 2008, the Government announced that it would make maize flour 
available at a subsidised price (Arusha Times, 31 January 2009).3 
 Tanzanias Strategic Grain Reserve (SGR) was decreased significantly mainly 
due to sales of maize and sorghum to the World Food Programme, the Prime 
Minister's Office and other public institutions as well as private traders to allevi#
ate food shortages in some areas. By the end of July 2008, the SGR had only 
75,438 tonnes left, which is 41.7% lower than July 2007 (The Citizen, 
13 October 2008).4 By January 2009, the grain stocks were again 121,769 
tonnes which were projected to last for six months when the next harvest sea#
son starts. The Government is required to have a stock of 150,000 tonne of ce#
reals annually (Arusha Times, 31 January 2009).5 
 In January 2009, the government stopped issuing food export permits to 
avoid a food shortage and said more than 240,000 people needed food aid in 
the country (Daily Monitor, 19 February 2009).6 The spokesperson for the Minis#
try of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives, Mr Richard Kasuga, said that 
Tanzania did not have enough food for its own citizens' consumption and could, 
therefore,  
 
'not bail out its equally needy neighbours. […] We have strengthened se#
curity at all the border posts. We have also stopped issuing permits for 
the sale of food out of the country until the situation normalises.'  
 
 He added that Tanzania had not received any requests from neighbouring 
countries intending to buy food from Tanzania:  
 
'However, even if such an appeal is sent now, there is no way Tanzania 
can sell food. We are taking all the necessary steps to ensure that even 
individuals do not export any food.' (The Citizen, 29 January 2009).7 
 
                                                 
1 East Africa Regional report on market prices, April/May tinyurl.com/cyjq2u. 
2 Crop Prospects and Food Situation No 2 April tinyurl.com/dyrvzw. 
3 tinyurl.com/dmfc7l, accessed on 20/03/09. 
4 tinyurl.com/crsfeq, accessed on 20/03/09. 
5 tinyurl.com/dmfc7l, accessed on 20/03/09. 
6 tinyurl.com/cc644k, accessed on 20/03/09. 
7 tinyurl.com/d626vx, accessed on 20/03/09. 
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 Also in January 2009, the government approved the import of 900,000 ton#
nes (10m 90#kg bags) of grain duty free. It planned that the government would 
import 7m bags for its strategic grain reserves while millers and traders could 
import the rest (Arusha Times, 31 January 2009).1 In March 2009, Tanzania 
removed import duties on grain until May 2009 to enable the import of 300,000 
tonnes of grain by the private sector. Tanzanian President Kikwete directed on 
2 March that the private sector was allowed to import the amount without taxa#
tion. This meant that any grain imported into the country in that period would be 
cleared through customs without payment of duty. The president also indicated 
that there would be more funds for agriculture in the 2009/10 budget (The Citi#
zen, 4 March 2009).2 
 Mid#2009, the food security outlook was rather bleak. An evaluation of the 
food situation conducted between May and June 2009 revealed that at least 
61 districts would face food shortage in 2009#10. The Tanzanian government 
(through the National Food Reserve Authority#NFRA) planned to buy 165,000 
tonnes of food including 160,000 tonnes of maize and 5,000 tonnes of sor#
ghum. The deputy Minister for Agriculture and Cooperatives, Dr Mathayo said 
the government would try to control inflation on food prices by letting the NFRA 
sell part of its food reserve in order to flood the market in areas where food 
prices are expected to rise (The Citizen, 11 July 2009).3 
 
 
6.4 Conclusions 
 
Tanzania's maize prices were one of the first in the East African region to in#
crease (mid#2007) due to a combination of factors, in which poor harvests 
played a role, but also high fuel prices. Because harvests in 2008 were rela#
tively good, prices decreased in Tanzania, while prices in neighbouring countries 
increased. The demand for maize from neighbouring countries put pressure on 
the prices in Tanzania, even though the government imposed an export ban but 
could not prevent informal trade. At the end of 2008, harvests were disappoint#
ing and by this time, cereal stocks had also decreased, pushing up prices. The 
government responded more aggressively this time, announcing it would in#
crease the security on borders to prevent export, even though the food insecu#
rity situation in neighbouring Kenya was still more severe than in Tanzania.  
                                                 
1 tinyurl.com/dmfc7l, accessed on 20/03/09. 
2 tinyurl.com/daosvg, accessed on 20/03/09. 
3 tinyurl.com/kjmfo5, accessed on 17#07#09. 
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 The direct market interventions by the Tanzanian government may exacer#
bate the food insecurity situation in neighbouring countries, pushing up prices 
even more in those countries, while producers in Tanzania are not benefiting 
from these high prices. When farmers in Tanzania sell their maize, prices are 
likely to drop temporarily as there is an increase in supply. If they were allowed 
to sell to neighbouring markets, where supply is low and prices high, this price 
effect would be dampened. However, the government is dissuading this: the 
spokesperson for the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives 
(Mr Richard Kasuga) appealed to farmers to reserve enough food for their own 
use and avoid being lured by middlemen 'who will come to you with promises to 
buy the cereals at much higher prices' (The Citizen, 29 January 2009).1 In reality 
there is much informal trade with Kenya, see also section 5.2. 
 
                                                 
1 tinyurl.com/d626vx, accessed on 20/03/09. 
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7 Uganda: government responses to high 
cereal prices 
 
 
7.1 Background: drought and food assistance 
 
In the period July#September 2007 excessive rains caused extensive flooding in 
Amuria and Katakwi Districts (see map # red outline) where crop losses, both pre 
and post#harvest, were very high. An FAO/WFP mission assessing the food se#
curity conditions found that there was an unfolding food crisis in the affected 
districts and in parts of neighbouring ones. At the same time, food prices in 
some rural markets were rising fast in 2008 and were double their levels a year 
ago (FAO WFP, 2008b).  
 In the North#East (Karamoja District # see map, green outline) there were 
three consecutive years of drought. The first season's harvest of 2008 was 
poor because of a long dry spell, while heavy rains, pests and diseases de#
stroyed crops for the second season. In 2008, 70% of the population in 
Karamoja District received food assistance (OCHA, 2008).  
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Figure 7.1 HF5crisis locations in Uganda 
 
Source: Encarta (2009). 
 
 Not only did the north#east of Uganda suffer floods and drought, it has also 
been afflicted with two decades of conflict.1 These combined factors have led to 
a food crisis: in 2008 over a million people were at risk of starvation and over 
40,000 children were suffering acute to moderate malnutrition (IRIN, 30 July 
2008; 19 August 2008).2 See figure 7.2 for the food security situation in 
Uganda for the first quarter of 2009. 
 
                                                 
1 The 'Lord's Resistance Army' (LRA), which seeks to overthrow the Ugandan Government, has mur#
dered and kidnapped civilians in the north and east since 1986. Although the LRA does not threaten 
the stability of the government, LRA violence at one time displaced up to 1.7m people, creating a 
humanitarian catastrophe. 
2 Available at tinyurl.com/cx55fd. and tinyurl.com/dexlgz, accessed on 12 March 2009. 
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Figure 7.2 Estimated food security conditions, 1st Quarter 2009  
(January5March) 
 
Source: Fewsnet (2009).1 
 
 
7.2 Prices 
 
7.2.1 General 
 
According to the IMF (2009b),  
 
'Uganda's economy has been among the fastest#growing in Sub#Saharan 
Africa. Building on a foundation of two decades of sound policies, 
Uganda achieved an impressive economic performance, with high 
growth, low inflation, and steady poverty reduction […]. In 2008 Uganda 
has been buffeted by two major shocks. First, the global surge in food 
and fuel prices has caused domestic inflation to rise above 15%; well be#
yond traditional comfort levels [Figure 7.3]. Global economic downturn is 
likely to affect both the demand for Ugandas exports and, more signifi#
cantly, the availability of financing for critical investment projects.' 
 
                                                 
1 Available at tinyurl.com/b3m2by, accessed on 12/03/09. 
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Figure 7.3 Inflation in Uganda (average consumer prices, annual percent 
change 199852009) 
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Source: IMF (2008). 
 
 A large part of the inflation was caused by food commodities (IMF, 2009b; 
Based on Ugandan authorities and IMF Staff estimates). 
 
7.2.2 Cereal prices 
 
In Uganda, although maize prices are higher than the five#year average, food 
prices in general are relatively stable and consistent with normal seasonal pat#
terns. The price of matoke (cooking banana) in Kampala in 2008 was 33% lower 
than in 2007. Maize is not a major staple in Uganda, but is largely sold as a 
commercial crop. Therefore, the rise in regional and international maize prices 
had a positive rather than a negative impact on food security in the country. 
(FEWSNET, 2009).1 Rice is another major (cash) crop in Uganda, and therefore 
we include it in this section. Maize and rice prices increased substantially end of 
2007, beginning 2008 (Figure 7.4). Maize prices fell mid#2008, as did rice 
                                                 
1 FEWSNET, April/May 2008 EAST AFRICA Regional report on market prices. tinyurl.com/cyjq2u, ac#
cessed on 19/03/09. 
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prices, but maize prices have increased again, fluctuating at a high level. The 
increase in price of maize in April was assigned to large scale purchases for 
schools, relief aid and institutional requirements. Prices have since decreased 
again (FAO, 2009).1 
 
Figure 7.4  Maize and rice prices in Kampala, Uganda 200752009 
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Source: RATIN (2009).2 
 
                                                 
1 Crop Prospects and Food Situation n. 3 July 2009. tinyurl.com/kwj27p. accessed on 10#07#09. 
2 tinyurl.com/bjjo72, accessed on 27/02/09. 
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 A study on food prices in Uganda has examined to what extent domestic 
prices were influenced by international commodity prices. It concludes that it 
does not see  
 
'rising global food prices in themselves and, beyond oil price increases, 
the factors that are generally accepted as causing the rise in global food 
prices as being important direct causes of rising general food prices in 
Uganda. Certainly higher global prices for wheat and rice do result in 
higher prices for those foods in Ugandan markets, since a significant 
portion of Ugandas consumption of these foods comes from the interna#
tional market. However, Uganda is generally insulated from many of the 
other factors causing the rise in global food prices because high trans#
action costs (particularly transport) make its participation in the global 
markets problematic' (IFPRI, 2008). 
 
 However, the report does point out that there may be secondary effects of 
high global food prices, especially when it is coupled with regional effects, such 
as the 'uncharacteristically high demand from Kenya' which resulted from the 
political turmoil (see section 5.4). When Ugandan food prices enable food trad#
ers from neighbouring countries (e.g. Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda) to profitably 
import food from Uganda (or Ugandan traders to profitably export), local mar#
kets will see an increase in demand and the prices Ugandan consumers face will 
rise. The IFPRI study includes a survey of traders to examine whether they have 
been able to benefit from higher demand and prices. It showed that only 10% of 
the traders indicated that they traded larger volumes than a year ago. The rea#
son for this is that because demand increased, so did also the number of trad#
ers, especially part#time non#professional traders.1 The IFPRI study also noted 
that equally important, capital and credit constraints that established traders 
face were exacerbated by the higher prices, which means higher costs to ac#
quire stocks, increased transport costs due to rising fuel prices, and the longer 
distances traders need to travel to acquire the stocks required. The result has 
been an overall reduction in the quantities that most traders have handled in 
2008. 
 
 
                                                 
1 This was confirmed during the workshop that was held in Kampala and Nairobi in December 2008. 
These traders are called 'brief#case traders' and consist of people who have a job, such as in the civil 
service, but will use their own money to engage in short#term trading and to make a profit. 
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7.3 Government policies 
 
In a speech made during Ugandas 46th Independence Day Celebration, presi#
dent Museveni explained why, according to him, prices were so high: 
 
'The major causes of high food prices is the high demand for our farm 
produce and the high transport costs as a result of high fuel prices and 
not well#maintained roads. Regarding the high regional demand for food, 
I urge Ugandans to take advantage of this and produce more for the 
market. However, Ugandans must be careful not to sell everything they 
have and remain with not enough food for their families; and also keep 
some for planting, particularly cereals. Our economy has been affected 
by high prices in other countries such as Kenya, from which we import 
some of our household goods. Since we import some of our consumer 
items, the high prices in the countries from which we import are also re#
flected in higher prices of our domestic goods.' Uganda Media Centre, 
9 October 2008)1 ( 
 
 The Ugandan government did not impose any bans, quotas, or other restric#
tions on trade in food commodities (IFPRI, 2008). In fact, the president of 
Uganda Yoweri Museveni told Commonwealth heads of government in June 
2008 that he was 'very happy' about the food crisis.  
 
'Why? Because we produce a lot of food. We are stuck with food. […] 
Our problem has been marketing ...'  
 
 The president hoped the food crisis would prompt the removal of trade bar#
riers, allowing countries like Uganda to profit from food surpluses (BBC, 
11 June 2008).2  
 The Ugandan government mobilised KES3bn (USD1.8m) to address the 
2008 food crisis in Karamoja (Figure 7.1) as well as in flood#affected neighbour#
ing districts and other parts of the country. It also stated that it would distribute 
high yielding sorghum seeds that could mature in 30 days and that it would pro#
vide tractors (IRIN, 22 May 2008).3 New Vision reported in June 2009 that the 
FAO had provided over 700 tonnes of seed, while the Government provided 
                                                 
1 tinyurl.com/bk72ax, accessed on 27/02/09. 
2 tinyurl.com/cgwk4u, accessed on 27/02/09. 
3 tinyurl.com/dnzq2x, accessed on 27/02/09. 
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12 tractors and rehabilitated Nabiny Agricultural Farm Institute in Karamoja Dis#
trict, which has been hard hit by the food crisis (World Vision, 23 June 2009).1 
At the same time, the World Food Programme (WFP) pledged to double the 
amount of food it buys in Uganda to about USD100m (UGX170bn) worth annu#
ally. The WFP is already the single largest buyer of food in Uganda. In 2007, the 
agency bought food worth nearly USD55m (UGX93.5bn); while in 2006 pur#
chases totalled USD48m (UGX6bn) (Daily Monitor, 6 February 2008).2  
 The approach taken by the government has been to improve agricultural 
production by increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the agricultural ex#
tension service through the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) 
programme. NAADS aims to develop a demand driven, farmer#led agricultural 
service delivery system targeting poor subsistence farmers, with special em#
phasis on women, youth and people with disabilities. The budget allocation to 
NAADS increased by 62%, bringing the total allocation to UGX97bn (USD59m). 
Ugandas finance minister Suruma proposed exempting income arising out of 
new agro#processing investments from income tax starting in July. To mitigate 
the effect of soaring transportation cost on food prices, there would also be 
tax exemption for trucks with a loading capacity of at least 3.5 tonnes (afrol 
News/IRIN, 13 June 2008).3  
 However, in a meeting with farmers and UNFFE (Uganda National Farmers' 
Federation), the government policy to boost agricultural production was criti#
cised. Data from UNFFE shows that the agricultural sector grew with only 1.9% 
growth over 2006#2007 which was a 0.6% drop over the 2004 and 2005 fig#
ure. During a national public hearing on agricultural policy issues facing small#
holder farmers, farmers said that  
 
'this is because of the unarticulated policies and institutional frameworks 
that are leading to a decline in agricultural production.'  
 
 According to the farmers, there was a lack of participation in policy imple#
mentation, especially in programmes like the National Agricultural Advisory Ser#
vices (NAADS), the Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture and the Poverty 
Eradication Plan. Further, NAADS failed to provide services to farmers. (East Af#
rican, 20 September 2008)4  
                                                 
1 tinyurl.com/law4fn, accessed on 17/07/09. 
2 tinyurl.com/beo2eh, accessed on 27/02/09. 
3 tinyurl.com/cfzlgw, accessed on 27/02/09. 
4 tinyurl.com/ck3852, accessed on 27/02/09. 
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7.4 Conclusions 
 
The cereal prices in Uganda seem to be influenced more by regional dynamics 
(several failed harvests in the Northeast and large demand from both Sudan and 
Kenya in 2008) than by international prices.  
 The approach taken by the Ugandan government is quite different from that 
of many other governments in East Africa. The government of Uganda seemed 
to be relatively untroubled by the high prices and imposed no measures that 
would bring down food prices for consumers. Instead, it chose to focus com#
pletely on stimulating the production side (seed, extension, tax exemptions), al#
though its efforts have been criticised by farmers as not being effective. It has 
to be noted that maize is not the most important food crop in Uganda and thus 
high maize prices would benefit farmers while not hurting consumers.  
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8 Ethiopia: government responses to high 
cereal prices 
 
 
8.1 Background: drought and food assistance 
 
In July 2008, several parts of Ethiopia were confronted with drought conditions. 
By October the situation had deteriorated. Poor secondary season ('belg') rains 
led to delayed plantings and partial crop failure (FAO GIEWS 2009).1 In southern 
and south#eastern Ethiopia, including the southern zones of Somali Region, pas#
toral and agro#pastoral populations remain highly food insecure due to suc#
cessive seasons of below#average rains, flooding in riverine areas, livestock 
disease, an armyworm infestation, conflict, inadequate humanitarian assistance, 
and extremely high prices of food (Figure 8.2). Parts of the Ethiopian state 
SNNPR became extremely food insecure after minimal rains led to a failed 
sweet potato harvest in the beginning of 2008 and a near failure of the 2008 
belg harvest. By August 2008 belg producing parts of Tigray and Amhara re#
gions, as well as parts of Oromia region, were also facing high to extreme food 
insecurity (FEWSNET, 18 August 2008).  
 Mid#2008, the Ethiopian Government and humanitarian partners estimated 
that some 510,000 tonnes of cereals were needed to meet emergency food 
assistance needs for 4.6m people until November 2008. This estimate of the 
number of people in need represents an increase of 2.6m people compared to 
the April 2008 estimate. However, at the time the Ethiopian government made 
the estimate of a total requirement of 598,000 tonnes, only about 130,000 
tonnes, or 30%, was available (or had been pledged). The World Food Program 
announced that, due to funding shortfalls, it had been forced to reduce food as#
sistance to tens of thousands beneficiaries in drought#affected areas and that 
the Program, without new contributions, may not be able to fully respond to the 
increasing food aid requirements resulting from the drought. The inability of 
WFP to meet all demands put additional pressure on prices. 
 By early 2009, the situation in large parts of Ethiopia was still critical and 
remained so in the second quarter of 2009 (Figure 8.1), although there were 
good 'meher' rains in Western Ethiopia. The number of Ethiopians requiring hu#
manitarian assistance in the first months of 2009 dropped due to good food 
                                                 
1 In Ethiopia there are two cropping seasons: the belg season are the short rains while the meher 
season are the long rains. 
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harvests in western regions of Ethiopia (IRIN, 30 January 2009).1 However, the 
situation progressively became worse in 2009 as Ethiopia faced high levels of 
food insecurity. A total of 7.5m chronically food insecure people received assis#
tance through employment in public works under the Productive Safety#Net Pro#
gram (PSNP). An additional 4.9m people required emergency food assistance 
through June 2009. In addition, about 200,000 people were displaced in the 
southern parts of the country due to clan conflict and are receiving humanitarian 
assistance. It was projected that there would be insufficient relief food in due to 
a combination of resource shortfalls and a shortage of trucks to transport food 
from the Djibouti port (FEWSNET, 2009).2 
 
Figure 8.1  Estimated food security condition, 2nd quarter April5June 
 
Source: FEWS NET (2009), Ethiopia Food Security Update June. tinyurl.com/lt2qha, accessed on 17/07/09 
 
 
                                                 
1 tinyurl.com/b5sq6g, accessed on 27/02/09. 
2 Ethiopia Food Security Update June. tinyurl.com/lt2qha, accessed on 17/07/09. 
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8.2 Prices 
 
8.2.1 General 
 
The Ethiopian economy has been growing rapidly from 2004#2008. Favourable 
weather conditions and pro#growth policies have helped sustain recovery from a 
sharp drought#related contraction in 2002/03. However, inflation has been high 
(Figure 8.2). The food price index reflects general inflation in Ethiopia: from 
2002, general inflation in Ethiopia has risen to 20%. The reasons for this high in#
flation rate are unclear. In a study on Ethiopian food prices, Ulimwengu et al. 
(2009) suggest that significant local factors have caused the food price surge in 
Ethiopia, especially the severe drought shock of 2002#2003. Loening et al. 
(2008) have reviewed several studies that have analysed the causes of inflation 
in Ethiopia (by EDRI, NBE, World Bank and IMF). They conclude that there was a 
lack of consensus on what are the factors mechanisms causing the inflation. We 
will not go into all the arguments here, because our study focuses on cereal 
prices. In Loening et al. (ibid), the authors conclude that the international 
food/non#food prices influence domestic prices in Ethiopia in the long#run but 
that there are large deviations from equilibrium due to agricultural supply 
shocks (e.g. due to drought).1 
 
                                                 
1 The add inflationary expectation, which carry over 28#44% of inflation into the next period according 
to their calculations. However, this would also induce farmers to grow more produce, increasing sup#
ply and reducing prices. 
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Figure 8.2 Inflation Ethiopia (average consumer prices, annual percent 
change 199852008) 
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Source: International Monetary Fund # 2009 World Economic Outlook.1 
 
 Ulimwengu et al. (2009) note that between states, food price inflation differs 
considerably (Figure 8.3), which can be explained by the fact that local demand 
and supply factors play a significant role on the one hand, and limited price 
transmission on the other (i.e. shortages in one area are not easily replenished 
with surpluses from other regions thus equilibrating prices). 
 
                                                 
1 Available at tinyurl.com/2kjkm6. 
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Figure 8.3 Food inflation in regions of Ethiopia, end5of5period rates (%) 
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a) With perfect price transmission, the lines for individual years should be flat # i.e. equal for all states. 
Source: Ulimwengu et al. (2009). 
 
 On the demand side, influx of refugees may explain sudden price hikes, such 
as in Benishangul#Gumuz. On the supply side, weather conditions lead to differ#
ences in the performance of the agricultural sector across regions, explaining 
some of the price heterogeneity observed across regions. The differences 
should disappear when markets function. However, inadequate infrastructure 
and food markets with high transaction costs in Ethiopia restrict trade between 
surplus and deficit grain#producing regions could explain regional heterogeneity 
in prices). In fact, Ulimwengu et al. (ibid) found that none of the Ethiopian local 
maize markets were integrated to the world maize market. In other words, 
these markets do not share a common long#run trend in their respective price 
with the world maize market. In addition, they could not find evidence of market 
integration among Ethiopian regional maize markets. This reflects very high 
transaction costs of food markets. 
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8.2.2 Cereal prices 
 
In general, the prices of the three main cereals (teff, wheat and maize) have 
been increasing since 2004 in Ethiopia (Figure 8.4). In the first half of 2008, the 
increase was strongest. It is also interesting to note that the price movements 
of these three cereals seem to be highly correlated.  
 
Figure 8.4 Prices for teff, wheat and maize 200452008 Ethiopia 
 
Source: FAO and WFP (2008). 
 
 However, mid#2008, prices for maize in Ethiopia started to decrease again, 
although staying at high levels (Figure 8.5). 
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Figure 8.5 Maize prices (in USD per tonne) Ethiopia 200752009 
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Source: RATIN (2009). 
 
 Figure 8.6 shows that the domestic prices for wheat and maize were higher 
than import parity and export parity.1 This means that it was much cheaper to 
import maize or wheat than buy it locally. It also means that Ethiopia was not 
competitive on the world market # its domestic prices were much higher than 
world market prices. 
 
                                                 
1 Import parity price is the price that a purchaser pays or can expect to pay for an imported good, 
thus the c.i.f. import price plus tariff plus all other costs (e.g. marketing, handling, transport and 
taxes) incurred in getting the imports to the point of sale. Export parity price is the world price multi#
plied by the exchange rate, minus all other costs (e.g. marketing, handling, transport and taxes) in#
curred in getting the exports to the foreign customer, and minus the tariff in that market. 
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Figure 8.6 Domestic maize prices and import and export parity Ethiopia 
200652008 
 
Source: FAO (2009).1 
 
                                                 
1 tinyurl.com/bcesz9. 
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Figure 8.7 Regional prices for maize (in USD per tonne)  
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Source: Central Statistical Agency Ethiopia (2009).1 
 
 Figure 8.7 shows that, as in Kenya, prices diverged more in the period in 
which they were relatively high (in June the difference was almost 50%). In some 
cases (e.g. Asayita market and Gambela market) the prices even have opposite 
trends (decreasing and increasing respectively). As in Kenya, this indicates that 
markets are not functioning efficiently, and that relative deficits and surpluses 
are not equalised through trade. In Figure 8.8 the markets mentioned in 
Figure 8.7 are depicted. 
 
                                                 
1 Available at tinyurl.com/cu5hce. 
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Figure 8.8  Trade routes and places in Ethiopia (maize) 
 
Source: Fews Net (2009).1 
 
 This reflects the high transaction and transport costs in Ethiopia. As Figure 
8.8 shows, cereals (e.g. maize) must be transported over large distances, from 
surplus areas to deficit areas. In Ethiopia, transaction costs are high (Gabre#
Madhin, 2007) and infrastructure is often inadequate.  
 
 
8.3 Government policies 
 
The government of Ethiopia reacted in several ways to high food prices, begin#
ning in 2007, when Ethiopia introduced a ban on exports of main cereals, which 
was maintained in the first months of 2008 (FT, 4 April 2008).2 
                                                 
1 tinyurl.com/c7qtof. 
2 tinyurl.com/cf75h4. 
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 In April 2007, the Ethiopian government created a grain stabilisation pro#
gramme to curb the developing crisis in the grain markets of the main cities. 
The scheme initially covered just the capital Addis Ababa but was extended to 
12 other cities. The Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise, which runs the pro#
gramme, estimated in April 2008 that the programme benefits 4m people in ur#
ban areas (FT, 4 April 2008). 
 In January 2008, Ethiopia increased the cash wage rate for the labour inten#
sive public works portion of its Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP)1 by a 
third, raising the annual transfer to food#insecure households in rural areas to an 
average of USD120 per year to restore its purchasing power to the originally 
designed levels (World Bank, 2008?). The daily wage rate which is used to calcu#
late cash transfers for public works in the framework of the PSNP, has been in#
creased from ETB6 to ETB10 (starting from January 2009) (FAO and WFP, 
2008).  
 In February 2008, the Ethiopian government stockpiled grain (IRIN, 2008).2 
It also announced a temporary freeze on the World Food Programme's (WFP) 
local purchases of food for emergency interventions. The government banned 
exports of the main cereals and grain stockpiling, and it imposed a temporary 
10% surtax on luxury imports to help fund wheat subsidies for the poor. The 
WFP began buying food in Ethiopia in the mid#1990s on the invitation of the 
government, to help firm up prices,  
 
'which tended to fall drastically at harvest time, resulting in farmers often 
receiving prices which were incredibly low, as farmers were under pres#
sure to dispose of their commodities to meet urgent cash requirements' 
(IRIN, 2008).3 
 
 In March 2008, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi announced the creation of a 
special task force to monitor and prosecute 'greedy' traders. Mr Meles had ac#
cused businessmen of profiting from and exploiting the situation (BBC News, 
March 2008). In a speech to parliament he said that   
                                                 
1 The PSNP aims to mobilise labour for public works activities (infrastructure and assets to promote 
agricultural productivity and access to markets such as feeder roads, soil and water conservation, 
micro#dams for irrigation), while smoothing food consumption, protecting household assets or pre#
venting impoverishment. The government targets those who face food insecurity and offers employ#
ment for five days a month in return for transfers of either 15 kg of cereals or cash equivalent of 
USD4.00 per month for each household member. Households with no labour and no other means of 
support are eligible for direct support worth the same amount (Demeke et al., 2009). 
2 tinyurl.com/dd4czw, accessed on 26/2/08. 
3 tinyurl.com/az39kw, accessed on 26/2/08. 
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'Such greedy and illegal business persons will only respond when each 
has been identified and punished. As a result, the government has de#
cided to completely change its approach toward those committing eco#
nomic crimes. A task force comprising members of the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry, the federal police and the National Security and Intelligence 
service has been set up to permanently monitor illicit activities and take 
prompt legal measures as necessary.' (VoA 18 March 2008)1 
 
 The perception that the private sector was unduly profiting from high prices 
seemed to be shared by many others in Ethiopia. The Daily Monitor (30 March 
2008)2 cited a source who claimed that  
 
'Government business enterprises have played and are still playing an 
undesired role fuelling the current inflation. […] As government business 
companies, these enterprises are basically expected to play a positive 
role in stabilizing the market to offset acts of greedy and a get#rich#quick 
traders and speculators.' 
 
 The claim that the private sector was fuelling high prices was refuted by a 
FAO and WFP report which put forward that the price increase in Ethiopia had 
different causes: 
 
'Ethiopia has experienced unprecedented economic growth since 2002 
and gross domestic product has risen by 48% in real terms as a result of 
substantial public spending and investment as well as private investment 
drawing upon domestic funds, increasing amounts of remittances from 
abroad and domestic credit. As a result, the general consumer price in#
dex has risen steadily. Food prices have risen faster than non#food prices 
in the last few years and the available evidence indicates that this is due 
to a 'classic' price inflation phenomenon and to changes in the behaviour 
of surplus farmers and consumers rather than to rent#seeking strategies 
and practices by traders.' (FAO/WFP, 2008a:5) 
 
 In May 2008, the government imported 150,000 tonnes of wheat which was 
distributed to urban poor at subsidized prices (and later in the year it imported 
another 150,000 tonnes). The Government further decided to cancel the value#
                                                 
1 tinyurl.com/cjeoen, accessed on 17/03/09. 
2 tinyurl.com/aeb9d3, accessed on 26/2/08. 
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added tax, turnover surtaxes on food grains and flour # which constitute more 
than half of the country's food consumption # as well as all types of tax imposed 
on cooking oil, and surtax on soap. It established measures which include provi#
sion of direct and indirect subsidies, and has spent ETB372 (USD38m) to sub#
sidise wheat and ETB3.52bn (USD366m) to subsidise fuel. The monthly 
distribution of 25 kg of wheat for low#income urban dwellers, which was intro#
duced in March 2007, continued as well as distribution of edible oil and other 
products (FAO and WFP, 2008a). 
 However, the government again blamed traders for the fact that food grain 
price stability was not achieved in some communities 'due to illegal practices by 
traders operating outside the law'. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi stated the gov#
ernment will take action against black market operators. It was reported that 
45 traders were arrested (Reuters, 21 May 2008).1  
 In August/September the Ethiopian Government sold about 190,000 tonnes 
of wheat from its grain reserve to about 800,000 urban poor and imported 
150,000 tonnes of wheat to meet demand in urban areas, while WFP and NGOs 
provided about 197,6292 tonnes of food to the increasing number of people re#
quiring food assistance (Demeke, 2009).3 
 In September 2008, the Federal Government placed an order to buy 
300,000 tonnes of wheat estimated to cost USD77m, on behalf of the Ethiopian 
Grain Trade Enterprise (EGTE), a federal agency responsible for the stabilisation 
of the domestic grain market. This was the fourth import of wheat by the enter#
prise since September 2007, although it was the first time for Prime Minister 
Meles Zenawi's administration to procure such a high volume. The government 
subsidized retail prices to cover transport cost from the place of purchase to 
the central stock in Addis Abeba (Addis Fortune, 15 March 2009).4 The Ministry 
of Trade and Industry announced that the government would distribute wheat to 
flour factories at a lower price (ETB5.5 per kg). The wheat was distributed to 
the factories at ETB3.5 per kg. However, several factories and related busi#
nesses still sold flour at a higher price (ETB8.5 per kg) (Ethioforum, 2008).5 
Subsidised wheat targeted at the poorest Ethiopians is sold at ETB3.5 per kg. 
                                                 
1 tinyurl.com/adru66, accessed on 27/02/09. 
2 OCHA, Ethiopia, Weekly Situation Report, Drought/Food Crisis in Ethiopia, 23 September 2008.  
tinyurl.com/aqarb8, accessed on 27/02/09. 
3 The government has recently announced a revision of the estimated number of people in need of 
humanitarian assistance from 4.6m to 6.4m, and the revision of the figures will necessitate additional 
resources. OCHA, Situation Report: Drought/Food Crisis in Ethiopia, 23rd September 2008.  
tinyurl.com/aqarb8, accessed on 27/02/09 
4 tinyurl.com/d6jgkf, accessed on 09/04/09. 
5 tinyurl.com/d7cpmd, accessed on 27/02/09. 
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Again, it was reported that much of this subsidised wheat is resold at much 
higher prices (ETB7#8 per kg) (BBC 21 March and 16 October 2008).1  
 In early October 2008, the Government eliminated fuel subsidies by fully ad#
justing the domestic price to import parity level. This measure was expected to 
save about USD200#250m per year and to be used to subsidize food consump#
tion (through additional food imports) whose benefits are considered to be less 
regressive than fuel subsidies. The overall balance of Government finance in 
2007/08 (including external grants) showed a budget deficit of 2.9% of GDP, 
the lowest in last four years (FAO WFP, 2008). 
 In February 2009, the IMF reported that Ethiopia would receive USD50m.  
 
'to mitigate the impact of exogenous shocks on the balance of pay#
ments, address domestic economic imbalances, and protect Ethiopias 
most vulnerable people.'  
 
 The Ethiopian government will implement various policies (Honda, 2009): 
# Eliminate domestic fuel subsidies. The fuel subsidy was abolished in October 
2008 by adjusting regulated domestic prices to import parity. The authori#
ties will review domestic fuel prices monthly, adjusting them as needed but 
keeping a margin above world prices in order to repay the debt of the Oil 
Stabilisation Fund. 
# In late 2008 the government imported wheat equal to more than 3% of do#
mestic crop production and distributed it to low#income families and flour 
mills at import cost # well below domestic prices. It is prepared to do so 
again if necessary to mitigate the impact of high food prices. 
# Significantly tighten fiscal policy and eliminate domestic borrowing. In the 
revised 2008/09 budget, general government domestic borrowing is tar#
geted at zero # down from 2.7% of GDP in 2007/08 # by containing expendi#
tures and enhancing revenue mobilisation through administrative measures. 
# Reduce domestic borrowing by public enterprises. Such borrowing will be 
kept to ETB4#8bn, 1.1#2.2% of GDP, in 2008/09, down from 4.4% in 
2007/08, by limiting investment activities and also by repaying the debt of 
the Oil Stabilisation Fund. The authorities have established an inter#agency 
committee to monitor key public enterprises and public institutions. 
# Tighten monetary policy. The National Bank of Ethiopia plans to reduce 
broad money growth to less than 20% in 2008/09 from about 23% at the 
                                                 
1 tinyurl.com/bcunpn and tinyurl.com/bjwmpf, accessed on 27/02/09. 
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end of the previous fiscal year. It also intends to closely monitor and control 
money creation arising from its net lending to the government. 
# Increase exchange rate flexibility. Reflecting this commitment, the official 
exchange rate against the U.S. dollar depreciated by 5% on January 15, 
2009. This, together with a similar#size depreciation on January 2, brings 
the cumulative depreciation since end#2008 to over 10%. 
 
 
8.4 Conclusions 
 
Ethiopia has been confronted with unfavourable weather conditions in various 
parts of the country, leading to high food insecurity in several states. Combined 
with already high food prices, this fuelled prices even more and led to high 
costs of addressing food insecurity problems. Despite efforts of the Ethiopian 
government to increase the supply of cereals (especially wheat) in the domestic 
market through imports, prices kept spiralling upwards and were at some point 
much higher than import as well as export parity prices.  
 Many in Ethiopia, including notably the government and its president Meles 
Zenawi, believed that the high prices were caused by a 'greedy' private sector 
and a number of traders were even arrested. However, the FAO refuted this in it 
report on the food crisis. This does point out the hostility of the Ethiopian gov#
ernment towards the private sector (and traders in particular).  
 One reason why domestic cereal prices in Ethiopia increased is a shortage 
of supply (due to reduced harvests in some parts of the country) and high world 
market prices (for tradable cereals such as wheat). However, it is not clear why 
prices continued to rise even when world prices started to decline and why do#
mestic prices were so much higher than world market prices. One explanation is 
that economic growth and increased demand fuelled inflation. Another is that 
the expectations that prices would continue to rise also played a role. The 
measures taken by the government against traders might therefore be counter#
productive.  
 Another notable feature of the Ethiopian food crisis is that food (in)security is 
highly regionalised and that food prices differ per state. This highlights the fact 
that markets are not functioning smoothly # balancing supply and demand within 
the country and equilibrating prices. High transaction costs (see 2.1) and trans#
port costs are the reason behind this. The government therefore could invest 
more in measures reducing these transaction and transport costs. It must be 
pointed out that the Ethiopian government did invest in infrastructure and a 
Commodity Exchange has been established in April 2008, which will not only 
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function as a central auction but also will disseminate price information through#
out the country.  
 The efforts of the Ethiopian government to bring down prices by importing 
wheat have been very costly. The government is now forced to implement 
measures to decrease its budget deficit. It remains to be seen how the financial 
crisis will affect the economy in 2009.  
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9 Comparison of East African countries' 
government responses to high cereal 
prices 
 
 
9.1 Prices 
 
Two major factors shaped the food security situation in East Africa. First, the 
climatic conditions have differed per region in the past years. When one region 
experienced drought, another region may have experienced good rains. Sec#
ond, the policy responses to cereal price increases have differed per country, 
and this is actually visible in a map depicting food security conditions in East Af#
rica (Figure 9.1). For instance, the border of Kenya with Tanzania is clearly visi#
ble. This also indicates at the fact that regional trade is not very efficient. If it 
was, it would lead to fewer differences between regions, balancing surpluses 
and deficits. 
 
Figure 9.1  Estimated food security conditions, 1st Quarter 2009  
(January5March) 
 
Source: FEWSNET (2009). 
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 However, cereal trade does play a crucial role in East Africa. According to 
the Regional Agricultural Trade Intelligence Network (RATIN, 2009), cross bor#
der trade has grown rapidly in the East African Community (EAC) since Decem#
ber 2008, following the second season harvest in both Uganda and Tanzania. 
Tanzania and Uganda have been the main source of maize, while Kenya was the 
main recipient. Uganda supplies Kenya, Sudan, Rwanda and Democratic Repub#
lic of Congo (DRC) and Tanzania has been supplying mainly Kenya. Busia border 
(border between Kenya and Uganda, Figure 9.1) has been very busy, so have 
Taveta and Namanga borders (Borders between Tanzania and Kenya). There 
was increased trading activity at Busia due to the high demand from Kenya. 
RATIN expected the maize inflow into Kenya from Uganda to continue till end of 
March 2009 after which it is expected to reduce as stocks diminish. In Tanzania 
harvesting started slightly earlier and the production was not that good. There#
fore surplus stock for exports are already low and Tanzanian traders and farm#
ers are storing maize for food security as they monitor the current season. 
Based on RATIN's historical border statistics, availability of stocks, demand and 
price differentials determine the direction of flow. Despite the fact that the Tan#
zania government put an export ban on agricultural commodities last year, sig#
nificant volumes of maize have been exported into Kenya. This is mainly 
because of high prices in Kenya. 
 Prices of maize differ considerably in the four countries (Figure 9.2). The 
minimum price difference is 15% while the maximum price difference is 228%. 
Again, this is a symptom that markets in East Africa are not very efficient and/or 
connected # apparently traders cannot make use of these price differences by 
making a profit. Compared to international prices, the East African prices are 
relatively high, especially in Ethiopia in 2008.  
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Figure 9.2 Maize prices Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Tanzania,  
200752009 (in USD tonne) 
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Source: FAO (2009).1 
 
 Domestic price instability tends to be highest in Africa, especially in land#
locked countries where the wedge between export and import parity is high be#
cause of high transport costs and poor market infrastructure (Byerlee et al., 
2006).  
 
 
9.2 Trade 
 
The high prices have hit the countries hard through their per capita cereal#grain 
imports, which are the highest in the world (see Figure 9.3). High cereal prices 
have meant very high costs to African countries. 
 
                                                 
1 tinyurl.com/cu5hce, accessed on 6 April 2009. 
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Figure 9.3  USDA estimates of cereal grain net trade per capita, by  
region, 196152008 a) 
 
a) Data are for standard trade years over a 12#month season ending in the year shown, from USDA PS&D database 
(www.fas.usda.gov/psdonline), matched with mid#year population estimates from US Census Bureau, International 
database (www.census.gov/lpc/www/ldb). 
Source: Masters (2008). 
 
 Especially Kenya has spent much on importing cereals, followed by Tanza#
nia, Ethiopia and Uganda. Figure 9.4 shows the countries' total cereal imports 
since 1995 (of which most is wheat) while Figure 9.5 presents their maize im#
ports. 
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Figure 9.4  Cereal imports (in USD1,000) 199552007 in Tanzania, 
Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia 
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Figure 9.5 Maize imports (in USD1,000) 199552007 in Tanzania, 
Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia 
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 The four East African countries in our study have imported maize mostly 
from other African countries, especially in recent years (Figure 9.6). Wheat, by 
contrast, is mostly imported from non#African countries. This means that re#
gional trade is extremely important for food security in East Africa.  
 
Figure 9.6 Maize imports from African countries as a share of total 
maize imports (average 199552007 and 2007) in Tanzania, 
Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia 
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Source: UN Comtrade database. 
 
 
9.3 Government responses 
 
Table 9.1 gives an overview of the policies that were implemented by the gov#
ernments of Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda specifically in response to 
the rising food prices. Of course all countries invest in long#term interventions 
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such as marketing infrastructure, antipoverty programs, agricultural R&D, natu#
ral resource management but these were not noted in the table because except 
for Uganda these were not mentioned in relation to the high prices. Most coun#
tries pursued short#term policies to reduce food prices for consumers (price#
oriented policies), except Uganda. Especially Kenya and Ethiopia, which have 
experienced high (cereal) price increases have imposed for the most part only 
price#oriented policies, followed by Tanzania. Ethiopia has also increased sup#
port through social protection programs (increased existing food for work pro#
grams).  
 
Table 9.1 Policies implemented to respond to the rising food prices in 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda 
Type of inter5
vention 
Short term (< 1 year) Ethiopia Kenya Tanzania Uganda 
# Reduce tariffs/taxes on food      
# Adopt food price controls/ 
 take action against profiteers 
    
# Adopt consumer subsidies     
# Adopt food export bans or 
 taxes 
    
# Pursue government food  
 imports 
    
Reduce food 
prices for con#
sumers (price#
oriented policies) 
# Release food reserve stocks     
# Increase support through  
 existing social protection  
 programs 
    
# Increase public sector wages     
Increase food 
availability for (or 
income of) target 
groups (income#
oriented policies) # Increase food aid programs     
Type of inter5
vention 
Medium term (153 years) Ethiopia Kenya Tanzania Uganda 
Same options as short term 
plus: 
    
# Establish food reserves and  
 release policy 
    
Reduce food 
prices for con#
sumers (price#
oriented policies) 
# Establish variable tariffs or var#
 iable export subsidies/taxes 
    
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Table 9.1 Policies implemented to respond to the rising food prices in 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda (continued) 
Type of inter5
vention 
Short term (< 1 year) Ethiopia Kenya Tanzania Uganda 
 # Pursue options to increase 
 domestic food production (see 
 below) 
    
Same options as short term 
plus: 
    Increase food 
availability for (or 
income of) target 
groups (income#
oriented policies) 
# Establish new social protection 
 programs or expand/improve 
 existing ones 
    
Increase food 
production  
# Adopt input subsidies     
# Adopt producer price supports 
 and subsidies 
 ? a)   
# Expand agricultural credit     
(supply#oriented 
policies) 
# Strengthen agricultural exten#
 sion 
    
Type of inter5
vention 
Long term (> 3 years) Ethiopia Kenya Tanzania Uganda 
Same options as medium term 
plus: 
    
# Invest in marketing infrastruc#
 ture, institutions, and informa#
 tion 
    
Reduce food 
prices for con#
sumers (price#
oriented policies) 
# Invest in increased food pro#
 duction capacity (see below) 
    
Same options as medium term 
and those for increasing food 
production plus: 
    Increase food 
availability for (or 
income of) target 
groups (income#
oriented policies) 
# Invest in other development 
 and antipoverty programs (e.g. 
 education, promote rural non
 farm enterprises) 
Public 
works 
   
a) It is unclear to what extent the policies imposed by the Kenyan Government actually supported Kenyan produc#
ers, which have protested against the low producer prices imposed by the government. 
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Table 9.1 Policies implemented to respond to the rising food prices in 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda (continued) 
Type of inter5
vention 
Short term (< 1 year) Ethiopia Kenya Tanzania Uganda 
Same options as medium term 
plus: 
    Increase food 
production (sup#
ply#oriented poli#
cies) 
# Pursue agricultural R&D    ? b) 
# Invest in productive infrastruc
 ture and assets (e.g. irrigation, 
mechanisation) 
    
# Improve natural resource 
 management 
    
 
# Improve property rights and 
 resource tenure systems 
    
b) The NAADS program was mentioned by the Ugandan president in relation to high food prices, but was not estab#
lished because of high food prices. 
 
 Table 9.1 does not, however, include the detrimental interventions that were 
implemented by the governments. For instance, the confusion that was created 
by the Kenyan government over the policies (with different ministries disagree#
ing over which policy was to be implemented), the less than transparent way 
certain policies were implemented in Kenya, which led to accusations of corrup#
tion, the price floors that were imposed and which were deemed to be unfair 
according to producers. In Ethiopia, the crackdown on traders, which were ac#
cused of hoarding and speculation when they were seen storing more than a 
certain amount of grains. In Tanzania, the accusations that 'greedy neighbours' 
were driving up prices. All these did not help markets to function by clearing 
demand and supply and establish equilibrium market prices. These detrimental 
interventions combined with policies in Table 9.1 especially hampered regional 
trade between the countries. 
 It is interesting to note that despite the various interventions to reduce con#
sumer prices by the governments of Kenya and Ethiopia, prices have not (yet) 
come down substantially. Both countries are still facing very high prices, al#
though the prices in Ethiopia have come down. It remains to be seen therefore, 
to what extent the policies pursued were successful, especially when taking into 
consideration the negative effects (corruptions, backlash against traders, beg#
gar#thy#neighbour policies).  
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 Uganda seems to be the exception because the government saw the high 
prices not as a problem but as an opportunity. Although Uganda has its regions 
with relatively high food insecurity (due to internal conflict and climate#related 
events such as flooding), on the whole, the country has been able to attain a 
relatively high productivity level and could therefore be more optimistic.  
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10 Discussion and conclusions  
 
 
In this study we focused on government interventions in cereal markets in four 
East African countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) in the context of 
high international food prices in 2008. These high prices of 2008 remained high 
in 2009 in East Africa (although there are some differences between the four 
countries), while international prices decreased. This has caused a dilemma for 
governments: how to choose the optimal extent of intervention in agricultural in#
put and output markets, balancing the needs and interests of the poor urban 
population and the net food buyers in rural areas on the one hand and the inter#
ests of farmers on the other hand. The first group benefits from government in#
tervention to keep domestic cereal prices low, while farmers prefer high prices, 
especially because prices of inputs (such as seeds and fertilisers) also have in#
creased in the past two years.  
 There are four major areas where governments can influence prices and 
price transmission: 
1. trade policy (border measures such as tariffs and quotas); 
2. subsidies and taxes (focused on farmers); 
3. institutional reforms and infrastructure (focuses on institutions); 
4. public goods and transfers (focused on consumers). 
 
 Over the past decades, East African governments intervened in the agricul#
tural sector especially in the first two areas, but often with a negative effect on 
the agricultural sector. During the 1960s and 1970s # the phase of import#
substitution industrialisation # government policy was very much biased against 
agriculture. This bias has been decreased by the reforms of the 1980s and 
1990s, especially by reducing the taxation of exports. Nowadays, agriculture in 
Kenya and to a lesser extent Uganda is supported, but anti#agricultural (macro#
economic) policies still exist in Ethiopia and Tanzania. Most cash crops in Sub#
Saharan Africa (such as cocoa, tea and coffee) have always been and still are 
heavily taxed. For cereals, the picture is mixed: some crops (e.g. sorghum) are 
subsidised, but other crops (such as rice, maize and millet) face net taxation.  
 Institutions (markets and infrastructure) and institutional reforms play a cen#
tral role in the system of price transmission. Governments can influence the 
functioning of markets through the institutional environment that facilitates/ 
governs these markets. In reality however, most (transactions in) cereal markets 
in East Africa are not governed by a well established institutional framework with 
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clear formal rules but rather by informal institutional arrangements between 
market participants. Because the East African countries in this study lack a 
strong institutional environment, transaction risks in food markets are high and 
market participants face high transaction costs (for contact, contract and con#
trol).  
 The governments in East Africa almost exclusively resorted to short#term 
price#oriented policies that reduced prices for consumers, with Uganda being 
the exception. In general, the policies had little effect with regard to stabilisation 
of prices and markets: overall, prices continued to fluctuate and rise. The poli#
cies also did little to improve the situation of farmers since governments did not 
pay much attention to supply#oriented policies. Farmers often did receive higher 
prices, but at the same time farmers suffered from extraordinarily high input 
prices. In addition, some governments (e.g. in Kenya) introduced price controls 
which have a short term positive effect on lowering consumer prices, but a long 
term detrimental effect on farm#gate prices. The policies can thus best be 
summarised as a treatment of symptoms (i.e. high prices) instead of focusing 
on root causes. Government policies did not tackle the fundamental problems of 
transaction risks and costs that market participants in East Africa usually face. 
Some government policies also triggered new transaction costs.  
 One short#term measure that was implemented by Tanzania, Kenya and 
Ethiopia was an export ban (combined with reduction of import barriers). At re#
gional level these unilateral measures increased food insecurity ('beggar thy 
neighbour'). They prevented farmers from taking advantage of higher prices in 
neighbouring countries, while they also prevented surplus cereals to cross bor#
ders to deficit areas. These measures continue to exist, although there are sev#
eral regional trade agreements in East Africa, such as EAC and COMESA that 
agree on reducing trade barriers. The problem is that trade (liberalisation) poli#
cies are not integrated/consistent with national sectoral policies that could ad#
dress supply#side response issues. This has prevented the region from attaining 
its full potential in agricultural exports even within the context of improved mac#
roeconomic fundamentals. Although there is (informal) cross#border trade be#
tween the East Africa countries, this type of informal trade is very costly and 
risky. Therefore, a reduction of transaction risks and costs at regional level and 
a strong commitment to the existing trade agreements are crucial to ease 
cross#border trade and to better regulate (regional) food surpluses and food 
shortages.  
 We can draw several conclusions with respect to the role of government in 
food markets. First, our study has highlighted the fact that governments often 
intervene directly in markets (as in Kenya, Tanzania and Ethiopia), with (unin#
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tended) adverse consequences. Many economists have therefore argued that 
the role of the government is to improve the conditions (i.e. institutional envi#
ronment) in which trade and markets are embedded, more than directly inter#
vene in markets. However, Moore and Schmitz (2008) warn against 'legal 
formalism' and 'property rights fundamentalism' which put much focus and faith 
on the formal institutional environment. They argue that the institutional and po#
litical reforms needed to improve the formal institutional environment may not 
be achievable within a reasonable time span. Besides, the rule of law is not an 
end in itself but a means to provide investors with what they need: assurance 
that their property rights will not be violated. Legal formalism might be neither 
the only nor necessarily the best way for governments to provide investors with 
the assurances they need. 
 Thus, as our conceptual framework has outlined, informal institutional ar#
rangements can be an alternative to a (badly functioning) institutional environ#
ment. Moore and Schmitz (ibid) make a similar argument and recommend that 
policy#makers (and donors) depend as far as possible on the many self#regula#
tion systems (i.e. informal institutional arrangements) that exist # and not to take 
measures that might undermine these self#regulation mechanisms without put#
ting something better in their place. There are several examples of how informal 
institutional arrangements can be supported. Currently, many farmers do not 
specialise in (cash) crops but diversify and reserve part of their land for food 
crops, which is rational in the light of fluctuating harvests and prices. This strat#
egy reduces their risk but hampers productivity growth. If farmers would spe#
cialise more, investments in terms of inputs (seeds, fertiliser) would become 
more economic. Market#based instruments can reduce price and income risks 
of farmers, thus facilitating specialisation and a shift to a more professional ag#
riculture that can achieve a higher productivity. Such instruments can include 
warehouse receipts systems, forward contracts, credit facilities linked to har#
vests and other marketing instruments that reduce price or income risks. Gov#
ernment policies to initiate and support local private initiatives, as well as 
international donors to help with finance and expertise can play an important 
role in reducing transaction risks and encourage productivity growth.  
 Second, although there is thus a role for government in improving food mar#
kets by supporting (informal) institutional arrangements that reduce transaction 
costs and risks, our study also highlighted that in general, the East Africa gov#
ernments resorted to short#term, ad#hoc policy measures that at least showed 
the public they were doing something. These actions and also the agricultural 
distortions of net taxing agricultural production can be explained by a political 
economy approach which acknowledges that economic and political systems 
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are intertwined (see North et al., 2009; Rausser and Roland, 2010). This study 
makes clear that the policies and action of the governments were very much in#
spired by politics. Unsworth (2009) points out that this view has important con#
sequences for donor policy. She signals that most donor#led development 
debates still focus on policy and practice instead of applying political economy 
analysis to specific aspects of development practice. She finds that donors 
have remarkably little interest in understanding the political processes involved 
in building more effective public authority and aligning incentives around produc#
tive use of resources. Because of a poor diagnosis of the real problems and 
processes,1 donors have often come up with defective solutions.  
 In this light, the approach 'Framework for Strategic Governance and Corrup#
tion Analysis' (SGACA) that the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs has 
adopted is a step in the right direction. This approach can be very useful in un#
derstanding agricultural markets as well. The analysis includes a 'Power and 
Change Analysis' (PCA) which comprises an institutional analysis ('rules of the 
game') that should lead to more insight into how formal and informal institutions 
of the state, civil society and the private sector shape the way business (e.g. 
agricultural markets and trade) is conducted and how relationships are man#
aged. It also includes an analysis of key actors' capacities and interests, the 
events and pressures (context) to which they are responding and a mapping of 
factors that fundamentally shape the state and political system.  
 Unsworth (2008) also suggests to donors that instead of seeing their role as 
experts bringing solutions, or as politically neutral 'partners', they should see 
themselves as convenors, facilitators and politically aware contributors to seri#
ous debate. They would find it easier to have an honest debate about a range of 
politically sensitive governance issues if these did not form part of the condi#
tionality attached to large financial aid transfers. This is particularly true for is#
sues concerning market institutions: there is no set of solutions ready to be 
applied to markets that will reduce transaction costs and risks immediately. 
Markets in developing countries form a complex interactive system that cannot 
be improved by quick#fix solutions but need more systemic transformations. A 
debate with national governments about the useful role of traders and middle#
men, recognising the valuable functions they perform, finding ways to support 
them (or at least not obstruct and marginalise them) would already be helpful. 
 
                                                 
1 Most of the debates that have shaped donor thinking and practice have been led by economists 
(such as Jeffrey Sachs, William Easterly, Paul Collier, Dani Rodrik). Although these economists have 
alluded to fundamentally political issues (why governments lack the capacity and incentives to tackle 
poverty) most did not investigate the underlying causes and processes at work.  
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